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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42680
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE TIMOTHY HANSEN

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO ·

000001

Date: 1/28/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 03:51 PM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 5

User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell

State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley
Date

Code

User

4/19/2013

NCRF

PRSCHOKF

New Case Filed - Felony

Magistrate Court Clerk

PROS

PRSCHOKF

Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor

Magistrate Court Clerk

CRCO

TCMCCOSL

Criminal Complaint

Magistrate Court Clerk

HRSC

TCMCCOSL

Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment
04/19/2013 01:30 PM)

Theresa Gardunia

ARRN·

TCCAMPAM

Hearing result for Video Arraignment scheduled
on 04/19/2013 ~1:30 PM: Arraignment/ First
Appearance

Theresa Gardunia

HRSC

TCCAMPAM

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 05/10/2013
08:30 AM)

Theresa Gardunia

BSET

TCCAMPAM

BOND SET: at 150000.00 - (137-2732B(a)(1)
Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana )

Magistrate Court Clerk

NOTH

MAHOLMSM

Notice Of Hearing

Magistrate Court Clerk

4/22/2013

BNDS

TCWADAMC

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 150000.00 )

Magistrate Court Clerk

4/23/2013

PROS

PRBRIGCA

Prosecutor assigned Holly A Koole

Magistrate Court Clerk

5/1/2013

NOAP

TCTONGES

Notice Of Appearance/ Bublitz

Magistrate Court Clerk

RODD

TCTONGES

Defendant's Request for Discovery

Ma~istrate Court Clerk

RODD

TCTONGES

Defendant's Request for Discovery/ specific

Magistrate Court Clerk

PHRD

TCTONGES

Preliminary Hearing Response to Request for
Discovery and Objections

Magistrate Court Clerk

RODS

TCTONGES

State/City Request for Discovery

Magistrate Court Clerk

STIP

TCCHRIKE

Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Preliminary
Hearing

Magistrate Court Clerk

ORDR

CCMANLHR

Order to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing

Magistrate Court Clerk

CHGA

CCMANLHR

Judge Change: Administrative

Theresa Gardunia

CONT

CCMANLHR

Continued (Preliminary 06/12/2013 08:30 AM)

Theresa Gardunia

5/29/2013

PHRD

TCTONGES

Preliminary Hearing Response to Request for
Discovery and Objections
I first supplemental

Theresa Gardunia

6/12/2013

HRWV

CCMANLHR

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on
06/12/2013 08:30 AM: Hearing Waived

Theresa Gardunia

PHWV

CCMANLHR

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on
06/12/2013 08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing
Waived (bound Over)

Theresa Gardunia

CHGB

CCMANLHR

Change Assigned Judge: Bind Over

Theresa Gardunia

HRSC

CCMANLHR

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 06/28/2013
09:00AM)

Theresa Gardunia

COMT

CCMANLHR

Commitment

Theresa Gardunia

NOTH

CCMANLHR

Notice Of Hearing

Theresa Gardunia

INFO

TCCHRIKE

Information

Timothy Hansen

PROS

PRMORTIF

Prosecutor assigned Jill Longhurst

Timothy Hansen

!

5/8/2013

5/9/2013

6/13/2013

Judge
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell

State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley
Date

Code

User

6/28/2013

DCAR

DCOLSOMA

Judge
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on
06/28/2013 09:00 AM: District Court
Arraignment- Court Reporter: V. Gosney
Number of Pages: less than 50

Timothy Hansen

Timothy Hansen

/

I

HRSC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference ·
09/13/2013 01:30 PM)

HRSC·

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/07/2013 09:00 Timothy Hansen
AM) 3 Days

PLEA

DCOLSOMA

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG
(137-2732B(a)(1) Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana)

Timothy Hansen

7/1/2013

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial

Timothy Hansen

7/3/2013

MDQJ

TCCHRIKE

Motion For Disqualification Of Alternate Judge
Pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(6)

Timothy Hansen

RQDS

TCCHRIKE

State/City Request for Discovery and Demand for Timothy Hansen
Alibi

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order for Disqualification of Alternate Judge
Pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(6) - Judge McKee

Timothy Hansen

MOTS

TCTONGES

Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing

Timothy Hansen

MEMO

TCTONGES

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Timothy Hansen
Suppress

7/19/2013

RSDS

TCTONGES

State/City Response to Discovery

7/26/2013

AFFD

TCTONGES

Affidavit of Thomas Campbell Kelly in Support of Timothy Hansen
Motion to Suppress

7/29/2013

NOHG

TCOLSOMC

Notice Of Hearing (8/19 @3pm)

Timothy Hansen

HRSC

TCOLSOMC

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
08/19/2013 03:00 PM)

Timothy Hansen

8/16/2013

MEMO

TCTONGES

State's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Suppress

Timothy Hansen

8/19/2013

CONT.

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 09/11/2013
03:00 PM)

Timothy Hansen

8/30/2013

OBJE ·

TCTONGES

Objection to the Form of the Defendant's Motion
to Suppress and Motion to Limit Defendant's
Motion to Suppress to Issues Identified by the
Defendant in his Motion/Brief

Timothy Hansen

9/4/2013

MOTS,

TCTONGES

Supplemental Brief in Support of The Defendant's Timothy Hansen
Motion to Suppress

9/11/2013

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Timothy Hansen
on 09/11/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: V. Gosney
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

9/12/2013

HRVC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 09/13/2013 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated

HRVC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
Timothy Hansen
000003
10/07/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3 Days

7/18/2013

Timothy Hansen

Timothy Hansen
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell

State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley
Date

Code

User

Judge

9/12/2013

HRSC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress
10/16/2013 09:00 AM)

Timothy Hansen

HRSC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
11/15/2013 01:30 PM)

Timothy Hansen

HRSC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/02/2013 09:00 Timothy Hansen
AM) 2 days

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial

Timothy Hansen

10/2/2013

RSDS

TCCHRIKE

State/City Response to Discovery / First
Addendum

Timothy Hansen

10/16/2013

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled Timothy Hansen
on 10/16/2013 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: V. Gosney
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

10/23/2013

MISC

TCCHRIKE

Defendant's Closing Arguments

Timothy Hansen

10/30/2013

MISC

TCCHRIKE

States Written Closing Statements Regarding
Defendant's Motion to Suppress

Timothy Hansen

11/5/2013

HRSC'

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
Timothy Hansen
11/06/2013 04:00 PM) Closing Arguments on the
Motion to Suppress

11/6/2013

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Timothy Hansen
on 11/06/2013 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: D. Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

11/15/2013

CONT

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Pretrial Conference 03/05/2014
03:00 PM)

Timothy Hansen

CONT

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Jury Trial 03/17/2014 09:00 AM) 2
days

Timothy Hansen

11/18/2013

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial

Timothy Hansen

12/18/2013

MEMO

DCMAXWKK

Memorandum Decision and Order

Timothy Hansen

3/5/2014

CONT'

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Jury Trial 06/16/2014 09:00 AM) 2
days

Timothy Hansen

CONT

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Pretrial Conference 06/04/2014

Timothy Hansen

03:00 PM)
3/7/2014

ORDR

TCWEGEKE

Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial

6/4/2014

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Timothy Hansen
on 06/04/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: S Gambee
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 25

HRVC

DCOATMAD

Timothy Hansen
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
06/16/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 2 days
000004
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell

State of Idaho vs. Th.omas Campbell Kelley
Date

Code .

User

6/4/2014

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 10/15/2014
03:00 PM)

Timothy Hansen

PLEA

DCOATMAD

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT
(137-2732B(a)(1) Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana)

Timothy Hansen

GPA

DCOATMAD

Guilty Plea Advisory

Timothy Hansen

PSl01

DCOATMAD

Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered

Timothy Hansen

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/13/2014 08:30
AM)

Timothy Hansen

6/20/2014

MISC·

TCLANGAJ

Agreement for Conditional Plea Pursuant to ICR
11 (a)(2)

Timothy Hansen

8/13/2014

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
Timothy Hansen
08/13/2014 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: V. Gosney
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

10/8/2014

MOTN

TCLANGAJ

Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal

Timothy Hansen

10/15/2014

CONT

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Sentencing 11/05/2014 03:00 PM)

Timothy Hansen

11/5/2014

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on
Timothy Hansen
11/05/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: V. Gosney
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

FIGT

DCOLSOMA

Finding of Guilty (137-2732B(a)(1)
Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana)

JAIL

DCOLSOMA

Sentenced to Jail or Detention (137-2732B(a)(1) Timothy Hansen
Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana) Confinement
terms: Credited time: 2 days. Penitentiary
determinate: 1 year. Penitentiary indeterminate: 7
years.

STAT·

DCOLSOMA

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Timothy Hansen

SNPF

DCOLSOMA

Sentenced To Pay Fine 5280.50 charge:
137-2732B(a)(1) Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana

Timothy Hansen

DCMAXWKK

Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 150,000.00)

Timothy Hansen

JDMT

DCMAXWKK

Judgment of Conviction and Commitment

Timothy Hansen

RULE35

TCLANGAJ

Timothy Hansen

APSC

TCLANGAJ

Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35
and Request for Hearing
Appealed To The Supreme Court

NOTA

TCLANGAJ

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Timothy Hansen

MOTN

TCLANGAJ

Motion for Exemption from Paying Fee for
Preparation of Record

Timothy Hansen

AFFD ·

TCLANGAJ

Affidavit of lndigency

Timothy Hansen

TCMILLSA

Miscellaneous Payment: Clerk's Record Paid by: Timothy Hansen
Kelley, Thomas Campbell Receipt number:
0120419 Dated: 11/20/2014 Amount: $100.00
000005
(Check)

11/6/2014
11/12/2014

11/13/2014

11/20/2014

BNDE

I

Judge

Timothy Hansen

Timothy Hansen
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell

State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley
Date

Code

User

11/20/2014

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order on Rule 35 Motion

Timothy Hansen

12/18/2014

HRSC

DCOLSOMA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
01/22/2015 02:00 PM) Restitution Hearing

Timothy Hansen

1/5/2015

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order Denying Rule 35 Motion

Timothy Hansen

DCOLSOMA

Order to Transpor:t

Timothy Hansen

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

Order for Exemption from Paying Fee for
Preparation of Record

Timothy Hansen

CONT

DCOLSOMA

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/06/2015
03:00 PM) Restitution Hearing

Timothy Hansen

DCOLSOMA

Order to Transport

Timothy Hansen

1/21/2015
1/23/2015

Judge

1/26/2015

NOTC

TCWEGEKE

(2) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Timothy Hansen
No.42680

1/28/2015

NOTC

TCWEGEKE

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Timothy Hansen
42680

000006

/

\

NO.it
A.M.

...l.l', 30

.,

\
FIL~~-·- - -

APR 1 9 2013
DR# 13-001161

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STORMY McCORMACK
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Kari L Higbee
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAlvfPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
COMPLAINT
Kelley's
Kelley's

PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me t h i s ~of April 2013, Kari L Higbee,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, who, being first
duly sworn, complains and says: that THOMAS CAlvfPBELL KELLEY, on or about the
19th day of April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime of
TRAFFICKING IN MARIJUANA, FELONY, I.C. §37-2732B(a)(l) as follows:

COMPLAINT (KELLEY), Page 1

000007

That the Defendant, THOMAS CMvIPBELL KELLEY, on or about the 19th day of
April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess one (1) pound or
more of Marijuana, a Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance.
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

Kari'IIBibee
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

JI,,

SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this

(L day of April 2013.

Magistrate

COMPLAINT (KELLEY), Page 2

000008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION

PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

STATE OF IDAHO

CASENO.
CLERK

DATE

~2M
_..:(l~ll

~

n

~ 2013

PROSECUTOR--1"'~-"-+-,µ.L....µ~~------

CASE I D = ~

COMPLAINING WITNESS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

COURTROOM

JUDGE

STATUS

D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

BERECZ
BIETER
CAWTHON
COMSTOCK
DAY
GARDUNIA
HARRIGFELD
HAWLEY
HICKS

0
0
0
0
0

MacGREGOR-IRBY
MANWEILER
McDANIEL
MINDER
OTHS
O__BEARDON
_z-- STECKEL
0 SWAIN
0 WATKINS

D
D

f
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

fei

\Q;?o[)
Y:lv\ \·?;BEG. \ tt,1)( Lp

WY:

TIME

END \ \

DDOV'

STATE SWORN
PC FOUND_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
COMPLAINT SIGNED
AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED
AFFIDAVIT SIGNED
JUDICIAL NOTICE TAKEN
NO PC FOUND _ _ _ _ _ _ __
EXONERATE BOND
SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED
WARRANT ISSUED
BOND SET$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
NOCONTACT

D.R.# _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
DISMISS CASE
IN CUSTODY

COMMENTS

0

AGENT'S WARRANT

0

RULE 5(8)

0

FUGITIVE

0

MOTION & ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

[REV 12-2011]

000009

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

) MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARING
) ;a-PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
)
Case Number: CR-FE-2013-0005250
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

Defendant.

-----------~ ) D

-.gfAC D BC DEA D GC D MC
Defendant:')21 Present

D

Interpreter: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

VJ~:BC~

PD/ Private_---=-=--------

D Not Present ?"In Custody D PD Appoint~en~Waived Attorney

Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ _ _ _ _ _ __

~ Advised of Rights
~Bond$

D Not Guilty D Guilty Plea/ PV Admit D Written Guilty Plea D No Contact Order
\'JOI (56D
D Pre-Trial Release Order D Provide
Evaluation

NOTICE OF HEARING

D
D
D

Sentencing on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at_ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __
Court Trial Conference on
Pre-Trial/ Jury Trial on

~
D

.PH:

on

I \")
'5!0(

at

am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __

at

am/pm w/ Judge

at

CO;?;{)

@tpmw/Judge~~:.=....__ _

Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telep

You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, or
default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infraction.
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702

C . . . _~- fl

I hereby certify copies of this nog·cewere served as follows:
Defendant:

Hand Delivered

Via Counsel

D

fn_=--~-...,.....--

Signature _ _ _Je[Y_""'""""-~~_.._........

Defense Atty: Hand Delivered
Prosecutor:

Hand Delivered

~

_

D

, Clerk of the District Court

Magistrate Judge (for Pre-Trial Memorandum)

DATED

4/tlf{t ,

.
000010

\1

0

..

.. May 08 13 03:48p .

?"~3436104

Bublitz Law

p.4

NO·-----::::-=--=-=-.-,..
Fl~ED
A.M. _ _ _ _
,P.M .......
J:2.
__

·2'.2,~
·~=----

MAY O9 2013
GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
501 WEST GROVE STREET
BOISE,IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500

Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By HEIDI MANLEY
DEPUTY

AECE\V.ED

MAYO 8 2013
Ada county Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISJ'RICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

*****
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.
_____________

ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET
PRELI~ARYHEARING

)
)
)
)
)

Upon stipulation of counsel, and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Preliminary Hearing scheduled for the

10th

day of

May, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. is hereby vacated and reset. The Preliminary Hearing will be reset to the
~ a y of

1::E /'Nz...,

, 2013, at

SO ORDERED this

'8· 30§),'fr.ffl':"

1._ day of

M4

, 2013.

~)

ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING-Page 1

000011

.. ,. May08 13 03:48p

r--3436104

Bublitz Law

p.5

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
, 2013, by the
instrument was served on the following this the _9_ day of ~
following method:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

Gerald R. Bublitz
Bublitz Law, PC
501 W. Grove St.
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: (208) 343-6104

l~)

~and Delivery
0U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission

D
D Hand Delivery

0U.S. Mail
9vernight Courier

D

[!3'Facsimile Transmission

ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARlNG-Page2

000012

h,

g IO

NO.
A.M._J

Fll,ED

P.M.----

JUN 12 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By HEIDI MANLEY
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Holly Koole .
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
COMMITMENT
Defendant's

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, THOMAS CAMPBELL KE~LEY,
h ving been brought before this Court for a Preliminary Examination on the
\

l/VV'{.

~ day or

, 2013, on a charge that the Defendant on or about the 19th day of April

, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of: TRAFFICKING IN
H~

~L~JUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l) as follows:

COMMITMENT (KELLEY), Page 1

000013

That the Defendant, THOMAS CAl\.1PBELL KELLEY, on or about the 19th day of
April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess one (1) pound or
more of Marijuana, a Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance.
The Defendant having so appeared and having had/having waived preliminary
examination, the Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate finds that the offense charged as
set forth has been committed in Ada County, Idaho, and that there is sufficient cause to
believe that the Defendant is guilty of committing the offense as charged.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant be held to answer to the

District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Ada, to the charge herei~ . Bail is set in the sum of$
DATEDthis~dayof

~

COMMITMENT (KELLEY), Page 2

,coo- .

150 t

,2013.

000014

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

BY_..,__..:..._~=--==-\----'
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

~~~~!
Defendant.

)

________________)

fo~
q_

PRELIMINARY HEARING NOTICE/ MINUTE SHEET

BL

Case Number ~ l 3 ,
Case Called

J!1Ada

D Special

PD/ AJom!!y

2:::,

:t\ , ~ :olk

0,&Jkij~

Defendant:~ Present D Not Present D In Custody

~

J

D PD Appointed OWaived Attorney

D Advised of Rights D Waived Rights D In Chambers D Interpreter _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
~Bond $

l9)Jv::p

D Motion for Bond Reduction Denied I G r a n t e d - - - - - - - - - - - - -

0 Amended Complaint Filed D Complaint Amended by lnterlineation D Reading of Complaint Waived
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG
Oe:PUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
INFORMATION
Defendant's

GREG H. BOWER, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of

Idaho, who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes
now into District Court of the County of Ada, and states that THOMAS CAMPBELL
KELLEY is accused by this Information of the crime(s) of: TRAFFICKING IN
MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l) which crime(s) was/were committed as
follows:

INFORMATION (KELLEY), Page 1
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That the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, on or about the 19th day of
April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess one (1) pound or
more of Marijuana, a Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance.
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

INFORMATION (KELLEY), Page 2

000017

Ada County Mugshot - Prosecutor's Office
User:

PRFREDSM

Name: KELLEY, THOMAS CAMPBELL
Case#: CR-FE-2013-0005250
LE Number: 1051391
Height: 600

Drivers License Number:
Sex: M

Race: W

Weight: 180

Drivers License State:

Eye Color: BLU

Hair Color: BLN

Facial Hair:

Marks: SHOULDER, LEFT
Scars:
Tattoos:

Photo Taken: 2013-04-19 01 :20 :00
Wednesday, May I, 2013

000018

.REIINST ALLS\ InHouse\Crystal\Analyst4\Sheriff\SHF MugshotProsecutor.r~

Hansen, Miren, 06/28/13, Gosney

Courtroom507

Time
9:21 :48 AM
9:21 :58 AM
9:22:00 AM
9:22:08 AM
9:22:23 AM
9:23:51 AM
9:23:55 AM

l

(State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250

istate Attorney
joefense Attorney
fJudge Hansen
lJudge Hansen
joefense Attorney
\Judge Hansen

9:25:24 AM

I

!sen Harmer
\Jessica Bublitz - Private Counsel
icalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel
!arraigns the def. on the Information
twill enter a NG Plea
!will set for a 3 day JT on 10/07/13 at 9 and PTC on
j09/13/13 at 1:30 p.m.
[END CASE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST&mfs?bPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MIREN OLSON

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DE'PUTY

Case No. CRFEI3-5250

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL

A jury trial will be held on October 7, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
A pretrial conference will be held on September 13, 2013 at 1:30 pm. The defendant must
be personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a
written list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all
parties. If the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be
continued.
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a
list of potential alternate judges:
Hon. G.D. Carey
Hon. Dennis Goff
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr.
Hon. Duff McKee
Hon. Renae Hoff
Hon. W.H. Woodland
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen
Any sitting Fourth District Judge

Hon. James C. Morfitt
Hon. Gerald Schroeder
Hon. James Judd
Hon. Gregory Culet
Hon. Michael McLaughlin
Hon. Darla Williamson

IT IS SO ORDERED this 2cb....day of June, 2013.

TIMOTHYHANSEN
District Judge
cc:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
501 WEST GROVE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL - PAGE -1
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'

AM.

~---JUL O3 2013

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
Sy KAiFIINA CHRISTENSEN
O!'.Pl.liY

GREG H. BOWER

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jill Longhurst

, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7707
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF
ALTERNATE JUDGE
PURUSANT TO I.C.R. 25(a)(6)

______________ )
COMES NOW, Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada,

State of Idaho, and moves the court pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(6) to disqualify alternative Judge
Duff McKee.

DATED this

~

ofJuly 2013.
GREG

ey

v,c.R.

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
25(a)(6) (KELLEY) Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2!l:.

day of July 2013, I caused to be served, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF

ALTERNATE JUDGE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 25(a)(6) upon the judge presiding in this
matter and upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Gerald Bublitz
501 W. Grove St.
Boise, ID 83702

j By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
D By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the

Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:
D By depositing copies of the same in the interdepartmental mail:

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE PURUSANT TO
I.C.R. 25(a)(6) (KELLEY) Page 2
000022
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JUL O3 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MIREN OLSON
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jill Longhurst
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
ORDER FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF
ALTERNATE JUDGE
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 25(a)(6)

The above entitled matter having come before this Court and being timely
filed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Duff McKee shall be
disqualified as the alternate trial judge in this matter.

DATED this~ day of July 2013.

Judge Hansen

ORDER FOR DISQUALIFICATION (KELLEY), Page 1
--

'

\
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AM. _ _ __,..._ M

GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
501 WEST GROVE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

JUL 18 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

*****
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

*****

COMES NOW the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his
attorney of record, Jessica B. Bublitz, of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C., and moves this Court for an
order to .suppress statements and evidence in the above entitled case. This motion will be
supported by the attached Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. The Defendant's
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Suppress will be filed soon hereafter.
NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above Motion to Suppress _will be heard on the

29th day of July, 2013, at 3:00, p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard before the

MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 1
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•
Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen.

DATED this §d.ay of July, 2013.

JE
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

\&t

I hereby certify that on this
day of July, 2013, I caused a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

D Hand Delivery
0U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier
IZ! Facsimile Transmission

MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2
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NO""" ~ ,
_..P.M,
A.M.------

GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
501 WEST GROVE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

JUL, 8 2m3
0 RICH Clerk
CHRIST~~~;.~HRISTENSEN
By Kl};

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-FE-2013-5250

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

)

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)

________________)

***
COMES NOW the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his
attorney of record, Jessica B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C., and hereby moves this Court
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section
17 of the Idaho Constitution for an order suppressing all statements and evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search and seizure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as articulated in this memorandum are those pertinent to the motion to suppress
· only. Officer Higley of the Idaho State Police writes in a report dated 4/19/2013 that on April
~

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 1
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19, 2013 at approximately 0020 hours, he stopped a green colored Honda Civic on Eastbound
I84 at approximately milepost 50 in Ada, County Idaho for improper signaling. Specifically, he
writes that he first observed the vehicle traveling in the second lane from the left, and the vehicle
activated his tum signal briefly for approximately two seconds, and then moved over one lane to
the right, thus completing a lane change without the required five seconds. (See Addendum A).
However, in reviewing the dash cam of the officer which was disclosed in this case, the attorney
for the defendant would assert that it appears the defendant used his blinker five or six times
when making the lane change, for approximately four to five seconds at least.
The officer writes that he made contact with the driver, identified as Thomas Kelley, and
a passenger. The officer writes that Kelley was borrowing the vehicle and did not have a current
insurance card in the vehicle. (See id.) The officer further writes that Kelley was talkative,
informing the officer that he had been stopped in Oregon and searched by the police, and that he
had been stopped for approximately two hours and had to wait for a canine vehicle to arrive on
scene for 30 minutes, and that it took him approximately one hour to put the items back into his
vehicle. (See id.) However, in reviewing the audio from the dash cam, it would appear the
defendant was consistently and appropriately responding to a series of questions from the officer.
The officer notes that he was suspicious of the time frarrie Kelley had given him and he noticed
Kelley had reddened conjunctiva and exhibited eyelid tremors. The officer questioned Kelley
about recent drug use and Kelley denied use of marijuana in two years. (See id.) The officer
apparently at that point searched the glove box and found rolling zig zag papers, which Kelley
stated were for tobacco use only. When asked for permission to search the vehicle, Kelley
declined.
At this point the officer requests Kelley to step out of the vehicle and moved him to the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2
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shoulder of the roadway, and he continues to question him and to discuss his plans for travel.
The officer noted his travel plans did not make sense, as he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson
Hole to visit friends only to return to Tahoe, and then depart again. He also found it odd that
Kelley spent two hours with law enforcement but could not say which agency it was that stopped
him. At some point Officer Plaisted arrives on scene with a drug canine, and he observed as
Officer Plaisted opened the driver's door and began searching the interior. Officer Plaisted
indicated in a separate report that the search was conducted according to alerts the d?g Turk was
giving him. This officer writes in his report that Turk alerted to what appeared to be under the
rear seat. A third officer on the scene, Officer Cagle, searched the trunk area and located three
large plastic bags containing a substance suspected to be marijuana. The probable cause for the
search of the trunk is not indicated in the reports. (See Addendum B).
ARGUMENT

I.

I. C. § 49-808(2) is void for vagueness as applied to this case because the
statutory terms have not been clearly defined so that average individuals
would understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute; in addition, the
lack of sufficient clarity in the wording of the aforementioned statute invites
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute
defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does
not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,490 (1982). It is a basic principle of due process that a

statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).

Vague laws offend several important values.

First,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 3
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"because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Id. at 108. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) Second,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them in order to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to police officers, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Id. at
109. Furthermore, due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998). Thus, "a statute may be void for
vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the
conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or
others who must enforce the statute." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003).
In this case, officers alleged that the above named defend
d signaling 2
seconds prior to a lane change. As noted above, however, the defendant disputes this. It would
appear as though he made the lance change, signaling for several seconds prior to the change.
The posted speed limit in this area is 65 mph.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999). A traffic stop, which
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, must be supported by reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or that either the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 4
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vehicle or occupant is subject to detention in connection with a violation of other laws. United

States v. <;ortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).

It is the position of the defendant that LC. §48-

808(2) does not provide adequate notice as to the conduct which is proscribed.
LC. §48-808(2) states, "A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given c9ntinuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5)
seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled.by
the vehicle before turning. The term "controlled access highways" is defined in LC.§ 49109(5)(b) as, "Any highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting
lands and other persons having no legal right of access to or from the highway except at such
points only or in such manner as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction
over the highway." It should be noted that this section is distinguished from the definitions of
arterial and through highways. It would by definition qualify as a through highway, defined as,
"Any highway or portion of it on which vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way, and
'

at the entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to yield
the right-of-way to vehicles on the through highway ... " LC. §49-109(5)(c).
In addition, linguistically, this statute can be interpreted in one of two ways, either
dictating that an individual in one circumstance (driving on controlled-access highways and
before turning from a parked position) must give a continuous signal of turning for not less than
5 seconds; while in all other circumstances for not less than one hundred feet; Or, dictating that
in one circumstance (driving while on controlled access highways and before turning from a
parked position) an individual must give a continuous signal for five seconds; and in all other
circumstances must do this (signal for five seconds continuously) and for not less than one
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 5
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hundred feet.
In this case, the phrase "in all other instances" is separated by commas. A prepositional
phrase ought to be able to be deleted from a sentence without changing the meaning of the
sentence. In this case, that would not be possible. If we delete the prepositional phrase from the
sentence, it reads, "On controlled access highways and before turning from a parked position, the
signal shall be given for continuously for not less than five seconds and for not less than the last
100 feet before turning." Clearly, this would set up the impracticality that all vehicles, even those
turning from a parked position must signal for 100 feet prior to turning, regardless of the speed
or length of travel. The legislature may have intended the "and" to signify a connecting sentence.
If that is the case, then the phrase "and, in all o~her instances, for not less than the last 100 feet

traveled by the vehicle before turning" is missing a subject and a verb. If we are to presume it is
meant as a phrase modifying "the signal shall be given" then it is correctly proscribing only that
in all other instances a signal shall be given for not less than the last 100 feet traveled by a
vehicle before turning.

In Burton v. State Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P. 3d 933 (2010),
the court held that the first subsection of this statute was void for vagueness as applied to the
facts in that case. In that case, Burton challenged I.C.§49-808(1) for failing to give adequate
notice that a signal is required when before one drives into a single lane that stems from the
merger of two lanes. See Id. The court held that, because it was simply not apparent from the
language of the statute whether a signal is required when two lanes blend into one, and persons
of ordinary intelligence could only guess at the statute's directive in that circumstance, that this
statute subse~tion (1) was unconstitutionally vague in that circumstance. Id. In this case as well,
subsection (2) of the statute does not provide adequate notice to persons of ordinary intelligence
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 6
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whether, when not on a controlled access highway or from a parked position, a turn signal for
five seconds in addition to 100 feet is required. Therefore, this subsection is unconstitutionally
vague as well when applied to the facts in this case.
II.

The officer in this case did not have justification or sufficient information
which would give rise to reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond the
original purpose of the stop.
·

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention "must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983). While officers may ask unrelated questions from the purpose of the stop
itself, on topics such as drugs and weapons, the proper analysis is whether the police action
increased the scope of the detention beyond a routine traffic stop. See Id. In State v. Gutierrez,
the occupants of a vehicle were questioned about drugs and alcohol for between 60 to 90 seconds
after receiving a warning for speeding. 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002). The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the officer's interrogation of the driver was unlawful because it was entirely
unrelated.to the purpose of the stop and unreasonably lengthened the detention after the purpose
of the stop was accomplished. Id. at 653. The case at hand is analogous to Gutierrez in the
sense that the duration of the investigatory stop was extended after the purpose of the stop was
effectuated, and without sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the purpose of the stop.
The officer in this case extended the purpose of the stop according to his police report by
several minutes subsequent to when he stopped the vehicle in order to bring a canine unit to ·
assist him in a search of the vehicle. In this case, the officer notes as reasonable suspicion to
extend the purpose of the stop eyelid tremors and red eyes, along with a story with regard to his
route their and a detention in Oregon that he finds questionable. While Courts have held that
strong odors in vehicles, combined with inconsistency in occupants' stories, can justify
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 7
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reasonable suspicion to extend a stop to obtain a drug dog, we do not have those factors here, or
even a combination of factors that would rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. (See State v.
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P. 3d 706). It is the position of the defendant that there is an
insufficient link between a route as described here by the defendant, or a detention of an alleged
amount of time that the officer finds questionable, and actual drug activity, and that any link
which could be made would fall into the category of "circumstances that describe a very large
category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures
were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a
seizure". See Reid v Georgia, 448 U.S.438, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980). Idaho courts have held that
bloodshot eyes alone are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion of drug activity; Whereas
eyes which are both bloodshot and glassy, coupled with eyelid tremors and reddening of the
conjunctiva of the eyes, are enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. See State v. Grigg, 149
Idaho 361, 233 P. 3d 1283 (2010.) Any widening at all of this standard would encroach upon the
defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

III.

There is no probable cause alleged which would have justified a search of the
trunk area.

The existence of probable cause to search the interior of a vehicle is not necessarily
sufficient to justify a search of the car's trunk. See State v. Schmakeda, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P. 3d
633 (2001). There must be specific, articulable facts supporting probable cause to believe that the
contraband or evidence is, in fact, concealed in the trunk. See id, citing Wimberly v. Superior
court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P. 2d 417, 424-427 (1976). In this case, it is the
position of the defendant that there is an insufficient indication that the officers in this case had
any specific probable cause pursuant to the trunk area that would have justified a search of the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 8
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entire vehicle. Reports from both officers indicate only that the dog was hitting upon the main
body of the vehicle, and that it was a different officer entirely who searched the trunk area.
CONCLUSION

The attorneys for the above named Defendant respectfully request that any evidence
obtained as a result of the detention which occurred on April 19, 2013, and the events thereafter,
including any statements by the Defendant which were made, be suppressed in the above entitled
action as they were obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure or the fruits thereof.
,']

DATED this~day of July, 2013.
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.

~BLIT
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I he~eby certify that on this ~day of July, 2013, I caused a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

D Hand Delivery
0U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier
IZ! Facsimile Transmission
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1. On April 19, 2013 at approximately 0020 hours, I, Trooper Blake Higley, stopped a green
colored Honda Civic (California registration 6SAS345) on eastbound Interstate 84 at
approximately milepost 50 in Ada, County Idaho. I observed the vehicle traveling in second lane
from the left. The vehicle activated its turn signal briefly for approximately two seconds, and
move over one lane to the right. The vehicle completed a lane change without signaling for the
required five seconds.
2. I approached the vehicle and made contact with the driver. and passenger. T
identified by his New Hampshire Driver's License as Thomas C KELLEY (
'---".nformed KELLEY the reason for the stop as asked for his Identification. KELLE
.
asked about the vehicle's registration. KELLEY informed me it was not his vehicle, but he was
borrowing it. KELLEY did not have a current insurance card in the vehicle. KELLEY informed me
he had been stopped in Oregon and searched by the police. KELLEY later stated he had been
stopped for approximately two hours, had to wait for a canine to arrive on scene for 30 minutes,
then It took him approximately one hour to put the items back into his vehicle. Very little luggage
was visible in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The rear seat on the passenger side
was folded down because of skis, allowing me to see Into the trunk area. I observed very little in
the trunk as well. I was suspicious of the time frame KELLEY gave. I observed KELLEY had
reddened conjunctiva, and exhibited eyelid tremors. I asked about marijuana use. KELLEY
advised he had not used since college, approximately two years ago. I observed Zig Zag rolling
papers In the glove box. I also observed rolling tobacco. KELLEY denied the presence of
marijuana in the vehicle. I asked KELLEY if I could search his. vehicle. KELLEY stated, 11 1 rather
you dldn't. 11 KELLEY advised he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole Wyoming. Sergeant
Jason Cagle of the Idaho State Police arrived on scene and advised me a drug detecting canine
was also on scene.
3. I requested KELLEY exit the vehicle with his dog. KELLEY exited the vehicle and was moved
to the shoulder of the roadway. I continued to speak with KELLEY about his. trip. KELLEY's
travel plans did not make sense, as he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole to visit friends
only to return ,to Tahoe, and then depart again. KELLEY advised he works in New Hampshire
during the summer doing landscaping, and skis during the winter. I also found it odd that
KELLEY spent two hours with law enforcement, but was unsure of which agency they worked
for. .Qfficer Marshall Plaisted of the Boise Police Department arrived on scene. Officer Plaisted
...._.....
-------- ----- ---- ___ , - - --
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deployed his drug detecting canine 'Turk" on the vehicle. I observed as Officer Plaisted opened
the driver's door and began searching the interior. At this time I placed KELLEY and his dog In

~

------------...,,,,..-"·--------=

4.Sgt. Cagle, Officer Plaisted, and I searched the vehicle. Sgt. Cagle located two vacuum
sealed bags under the trunk floor, near the spare tire. A green backpack was also discovered
with a third bag. All three bags contained a green leafy substance, which I recognized as
marijuana. A Tupperware container with two separate packages of marijuana. Upon discovery
of the contraband, I returned to my patrol car and placed KELLEY under arrest for trafficking
marijuana. I placed KELLEY in handcuffs, checked the handcuffs for tightness and double
locked them. I searched KELLEY for contraband and placed him back into my patrol car on the
passenger side. No other contraband was located Inside the vehicle.

5.1 advised KELLEY of Miranda. I asked KELLEY if he would like to talk with me about what was
found in his vehicle. KELLEY stated, "Not really, it would only be bad to talk about it at this
time. 11 I confirmed with KELLEY he did not want to try and work with us. KELLEY inquired as to
what I meant. I explained about conducting a controlled delivery. I asked if KELLEY was really
heading to Jackson Hole. KELLEY said "No.'' I asked him where he was going. KELLEY stated,
"Go on." While continuing to explain the controlled delivery process, KELLEY stated he was not
interested. I stopped talking with KELLEY at this time .
._., 6.Sgt. Cagle retained possession of the marijuana. Ada County Animal control was requested
for KELLEY's dog. I transported KELLEY to the Ada County Jail and booked hini in for
Trafficking Marijuana. KELLEY was turned over to the jail staff, and I had no further contact with
him.

7.1 responded to the Idaho State Police District 3 Evidence Room. I meet with Sgt. Cagle. We
weighed the three packages together for a weight of 3.2 lbs. I opened one of the sealed bags
and tested the green leafy substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK). The test was
presumptive positive for marijuana.
8.0n April 23, 2013, with assistance from Cpl. Cottrell, I repackaged all three of the bags into
one bag. Total, weight was still 3.2lbs. I combined the two smaller packages and weighed them
separately. Total gram weight was 4.9grams. I also tested the contents using a Narcotics
Identification Kit (NIK). The test was presumptive positive for marijuana. The remainder of the
contraband was packaged. I photographed the cell phone, and removed the battery. I recorded
the phones information including serial and model numbers.
9.0n April 24, 2013, I submitted the evidence for processing.

10.0n April 25, 2013 I applied for and was granted a search warrant to search KELLEY's cell
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phone from Ada County.
11.0n April 29, 2013, I contacted Evidence Technician Danielle Hendershot and advised her of
the warrant. Hendersh'ot advised the phone would be turned over to Karen Montgomery for
processing .

...__,.
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Idaho State Police Report B13001161.
On 4-19-13 at 0022 hours, I responded to a K9 request by Trooper B. Hlgley in the area of eastbound
Interstate 84 near Cole Road. Trooper Higley had informed me that he had received information in
regards to' a particular vehicle that would be traveling through Idaho from Oregon. Trooper Higley told
me that he had located the vehicle and would be making a traffic stop on it for a lane violation.
When I arrived at the traffic stop Trooper Higley was already at the passenger side of the vehlcle talking
with the driver. ISP Sergeant Cagle was also on scene upon my arrival. Trooper Higley had the driver
exit the vehicle along with his dog and had them stand on the roadside while he continued his traffic
stop investigation.
I deployed my trained and state certified drug dog, Turk. Turk is a four year old Yellow Labrador that is
trained and state certified to sniff for, and alert to, the odors of marijuana, meth, heroin, and cocaine.
Turk receives weekly POST certified training along with annual state certifications.
I approached the vehicle with Turk and saw that it was a green four door vehicle. I saw that the driver's
window was nearly rolled down all the way and the front passenger window was also rolled down. I
began working Turk from the front of the vehicle towards the driver's side. As I presented the driver's
door to Turk, I watched as his sniffing began to increase, he placed his front paws on the window seal,
sniffed along the lower door seam while his tail wagged, and he sat down. When Turk sat down, he
gave me an excited look in anticipation of being rewarded. I continued to present and tap along the
driver's side rear door, but Turk remained at the driver's door. Based upon Turk's change in behavior
coupled with the fact that he did not leave the driver's door as I continued to present other parts of the
vehicle, I knew this to be his alert.
I continued to work the exterior of the vehicle around to the passenger side. When Turk reached the
passenger side he once again began to sniff more rapidly, became excited, pressed his nose up agalnst
the passenger door with his mouth slightly opened, and sat down. I then placed Turk Into the vehicle via
the drive(s door. Turk jumped into the back seat where I saw a large bag of dog food. Turk began to
bury his nose under the bag of dog food near the seat back. Turk's tail was wagging excitedly as he
attempted to push the bag of dog food away. I removed the bag of dog food and placed it on the
ground outside the vehicle. Turk also began sniffing along the rear passenger ·floorboards. A section of
the back seat was down allowing several skis to fit inside the vehicle. From my observation, Turk was
sniffing low and the source of the odor appeared to be coming from under the rear seat.
Myself, Trooper Higley, and Sergeant Cagle began to search the vehicle {Sergeant Hunsaker, Boise
Police, was also on scene and stood by with the driver). Sergeant Cagle searched the trunk area and I
was informed that he located three large plastic bags that contained suspected marijuana.
Officer M. Plaisted #818
Boise Police Department, K9 Unit
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDA~O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

* ****

'
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

)

Plaintiff,

vs.

'

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF TH01\:IAS CAMPBELL
KELLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
Count)' of ADA
)

], THO::vfAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, do swear to the following to be true and a::curate to
th.e best ofmy knowledge:

1. On April 19, 2013 I was pulled over in Ada County, Idaho allegedly for an illegal
lane change.
2. The Officer who pulled me over did not have a warrant
3. I did not feel free to leave.
4.' The officer searched the vehicle 1 was dl"ivir.g and the trunk without a warrant and
AfFtDAVJT OF THOl\'lAS KELLEY- lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 1
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v...i.thout my permission.

DATED tltis,;?_')day of July, 2013.

SUBSCRIBED A.'ND SWORN TO before me this.2.5'day of Ju:y, 2013, before me,
No1try Republic in and for said state, personaU:y appeari11gh11s· Ker~ , known or
identified to me by the person who executed the foregoing ins1rumentacknowledged to me
that he(she executed the same.

lN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the
day and year first above written .

.-:•:J,)I:,
..
1~~- ·

MARCIE SHEAN

.:{~li·\ Notary Pul>lic, Slate ot Nevada
Appo!n1ment No. 11-4063-2

··\~~i1::'' My Appl. hpires Feb 26. 201S

(

AFFIDAVIT OFTHOMAS KELLEY- IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 2

000040

Jul 26 13 07:51 a

Bublitz Law

p.3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on th.is ~ y of JULY, 2013 I caused a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the follmving as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

D Hand Delivery
D U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier

~ Facsimile Transmission

\

~
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AUG 16 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jill Longhurst
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs."
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant,

______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
STATE'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

COMES NOW, Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, in and for the
County of Ada, State ofldaho, and hereby opposes the defendant's motion to suppress.

I. FACTS
The State anticipates that Trooper Higley will testify in detail to the facts and
circumstances relating to this traffic stop and consistently with the brief summary of the
events as contained in the police report which was attached to the defendant's
memorandum and the Affidavit for Search Warrant attached herewith [Exhibit l].
Additionally the State anticipates that the Trooper will also testify to additional
information known to him at the time of this traffic infraction which had been provided

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS (KELLEY), Page 1 of 13
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by other law enforcement officers from Oregon who had had contact with the defendant
and his vehicle prior to the traffic stop at issue in this case and information provided to
him by other officers during the course of this stop.

II.

ISSUES

1. I.C. §49-808 is clear and unambiguous as to what conduct is
prohibited and is factually clear as it is applied to this defendant.
2. Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant
was engaged in criminal conduct before the traffic stop occurred and
his concerns were further extended during the course of the traffic
stop .
. 3. Trooper Higley had probable cause to believe that the defendant's
vehicle, including his open trunk area, contained narcotics after a
drug detection dog alerted to the odor of a controlled substance in the
vehicle and based on information provided to the Trooper from other
law enforcement officers.

III.
PROCEDURAL CLAIMS

LC. §49-808(2) delineates both when a driver is required to signal

an impending

change in his vehicle's position and the appropriate method, by either distance or time, to
perform and signal depending on the nature of the roadway. The statute requires drivers
on a controlled access highway, such as an interstate highway, shall signal their intention
to move their vehicles to the left or right for not less than five seconds.
As to when a signal is required, in 1999 the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a
challenge to this code section and concluded that the signal requirement is necessary
when a driver is traveling from one passing lane to the next. During the course of the
court's review, the _Court of Appeals stated: "The language if LC. §49-808 is plain and
unambiguous and must be given effect." State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666, 991 P.2d
388,391 (Ct.App.1999). The Dewbre Court further noted that as to LC. §49-808 there
are "no exceptions to the signal requirement" and that a signal is required "whenever a
movement is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement
is made necessary to comply with highway signage." Dewbre, Id., citing State v.
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS (KELLEY), Page 2 of 13
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Pressley, 131 Idaho 277,279,954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998). In the instant case,
Defendant Kelley was changing lanes on an interstate highway with a speed limit of up to
75 miles per hour. See, LC.§ 49-654(2)(c). Changing lanes clearly falls within the plain
language of LC. §49-808(2) which states: "A signal of intention to turn or move right or
left when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic." There is not a
reasonable interpretation of this statute which would lead to the conclusion that a driver
need not signal prior to changing marked lanes. Consequently, there is no valid argument
that Defendant Kelley was not required to signal his intention before changing lanes or
that the requirement that a signal precede a lane change was unclear from this statute.
Defendant Kelley, however, claims that LC. §49-808(2) is unclear, and therefore
unconstitutionally vague as to the manner by which a signal must occur. The State
disagrees. LC. §49-808(2) specifically indicates "On controlled-access highways and
before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances ... " Kelley argues this provision is
"vague" for two reasons. His first claim is that Idaho law is unclear what constitutes a
"controlled access highway." His second claim is that the statute itself supports some
"linguistic" confusion due to what he claims is the ambiguous placement of a comma
which he alleges makes it confusing whether a driver should signal for 5 seconds or 100
feet.
In support of his first assertion of vagueness, Defendant Kelley claims that the
interstate highway, 1-84, where this crime occurred could be construed as either a
"controlled access highway," LC. §49-109(5)(b) or to the definition of a "through"
highway under LC. §49-109(5)(c). Although LC.§ 49-109(5) does provide a definition
of highway, Defendant Kelley's reading, which he claims, would cause 1-84 to be either a
"controlled access highway" or a "through" highway is amiss. 1-84, particularly the
portion of this highway which is involved in this traffic stop, does not allow vehicles
crossing the highway from stop signs or other traffic-control devices to cross the highway
in a perpendicular fashion. Therefore, 1-84 is by no means a "through" highway as
described by LC. §49-109(5)(c). Moreover, not only is Kelley simply wrong about his
interpretation of what the definition of a "controlled access highway" as opposed to a
"through" highway, but his attempt to limit the definition of a controlled access highway

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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to LC. § 49-109 is likewise erroneous. Idaho Code §40-310(9) grants the Idaho Board of
Transportation clear authority to "designate state highways, or parts of them, as
controlled-access facilities and regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways ... "
See also Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd. 151 Idaho 26,253 P.3d 700 (201 l)("There is
no question that ITD is vested with the authority to designate state highways as
I'

'controlled access facilities.' ... "). Accordingly, ITD has specifically designated 1-84 as
an interstate highway- which is by definition a controlled access highway. See e.g.
Idaho Transportation Department Highways Access Control Guide, August 2000
(designating Interstate 84 as a fully controlled access highway)[attached as Exhibit 2];
Idaho Transportation Department Access Management: Standards and Procedures for
Highway Right-of-Way Encroachments, April 2001 (section 1.3.6 regarding signing and
indicating the limitations to signs "on interstate and other controlled access highways."
providing the definition of Controlled Access Highway, p. 9; Interstate Highway and
Highway, p. 11; and National Highway System (NHS) p. 13) [attached as Exhibit 3];
Idaho Transportation Department/Idaho Driver Education and Training Strategies for
Controlled Access Highways Part 1 M13 April 2005 (PowerPoint presentation for
education at slide M13-3 "The words 'limited' and 'controlled' access highways are
interchangeable with 'freeways' and 'expressways"' and listing multiple designations
through the program or 1-84 as an interstate highway)[attached Exhibit 4]; Standards and
Procedmes for Specific Service Signs on the Interstate and Other Fully Controlled Access
Highway, ITD 2007 at p. 7 ("'Fully controlled access highway' -Any section of highway
system where access is prohibited except for interchange connections.") [attached as
Exhibit 5]; see also State, Idaho Transp. Bd. v. Hi Boise LLC, 153 Idaho 334,282 P.3d
595 (2012)(discussing eminent domain claims regarding improvements/alterations to 1-84
at the involving the on/off ramp); Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232,207 P.3d
963 (2009)(deterrnining the Chinden Boulevard is a controlled access highway).
Nonetheless, definitions of "controlled access highway" aside, common sense and
the ordinary application of the commonly meanings and common usage would clearly
indicate that a "controlled access highway" is a freeway or interstate highway such as 184. This term is used in its ordinary and commonly known meaning repeatedly in the
I

.

Idaho Driver's Services Manual, also published by the Idaho Transportation Department.
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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The manual uses the term "controlled access highway" interchangeably or as a synonym
for a "freeway." For example, the manual indicates that a driver may not park "On any
controlled-access highway (freeway)." at p. 2-8. [attached Exhibit 6] Drivers are
instructed that backing is "always prohibited on freeways, expressways, and other
controlled-access highways." P. 2-11. [attached as Exhibit 6]. Not only does the I.C.
§49-109(5)(b) make it clear that 1-84 is a "controlled access highway," but Idaho law
grants ITD the authority to designate whether a road is a controlled access highway,
which they have clearly and repeatedly done. More importantly, when considering
whether I.C. § 49-808 clearly and unambiguously gives motorists notice of which acts
are prohibited, it is clear in the common and known usage of the word that an interstate
highway is a controlled access highway. Accordingly, Defendant Kelley's argument that
LC. §49-808 is "vague" because Idaho law is unclear regarding whether interstate 84 is a
controlled access highway fails. Idaho law is abundantly clear that 1-84 is a very
controlled access highway. Defendant Kelley was clearly on notice that this was a
controlled access highway and the access restrictions of this road are known and obvious.
Similarly, Defendant Kelley claims that the statute is unclear whether a driver
should signal for 5 seconds or for 100 feet because of what he suggests is a confusing
co:rrima placement. There is no confusion as to the meaning and intent of LC. §49-808(2)
nor does the comma placement create any confusion. "The task of the court 'in
interpreting the meaning of language contained in a statute is to give effect of the
legislature' intent and purpose."' State v. Dewbre,133 Idaho 663, 665 991 P.2d 388,
390(Ct.App.1999) quoting State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466,469,915 P.2d 28, 31
(Ct.App.1996). What is more, Idaho Courts have clearly held that "[t]he plain, obvious
and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning."
State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998). A clear and
con~ise reading of the language of LC. §49-808(2) indicates drivers operating a motor
vehicle on a controlled access highway should signal for not less than 5 seconds. The
five-second signal requirement applies to vehicles moving from a parked position and
vehicles traveling on a controlled access highway. All other times the signal should be
given for 100 feet. Common sense alone suggests that the signal requirement for vehicles
traveling at high speeds on controlled access highways should be for five seconds. A
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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signal to other motorists traveling at highway speeds up to 75 miles per hour of only 100
feet is simply not safe nor is it ample warning. To imply that the legislature really meant
that vehicles traveling at 75 miles per hour could safely "warn other traffic" (LC. §49808(2)) of the intent to move with only 100 feet notice is by definition, unsafe. In State

v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277,279,954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998), the court made it
clear, safe warning was a clear prerequisite of I.C. §49-808.
If a statute truly were "void for vagueness" the statute would lack sufficient
clarity for "ordinary people" to understand what "conduct is prohibited." Burton v. State,

Dept. ofTransp. 149 Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d 933, 935 (Ct.App.2010) (citation omitted).
Idaho drivers' education courses throughout the State and the clear language of the Idaho
Driver's Manual very clearly explains this statute indicating that "Signals must start at
least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on freeways or highways)
before you turn or change lanes." Idaho Driver's Manual, at 2-9 [attached as Exhibit 6].
These manuals are written to be understood by 14-year-old learner's permit driving
students and foreign nationals. There is seemingly no confusion or inability to interpret
the comma to clearly explain what is prohibited in these State publications.
In order to prevail on a claim that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, a
defe!ldant must show either the statute is vague on its face or vague on its application.
"A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a
complainant's conduct." Burton v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 149Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d
933,935 (Ct.App.2010)(citation omitted). Defendant Kelley makes both claims.
Defendant Kelley claims that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it does not
give him "adequate notice as to the conduct which is proscribed." Memorandum in

Support ofDefendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 5. As noted above, in 1999 the Idaho
Court of Appeals noted that "The language ifl.C. §49-808 is plain and unambiguous and
must be given effect." State v. Dewbre,133 Idaho 663,666, 991 P.2d 388,391
(Ct.App.1999). The Dewbre Court further noted that as to I.C. §49-808 there are "no
exceptions to the signal requirement" and that a signal is required "whenever a movement
is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is made
necessary to comply with highway signage." Dewbre, Id The holdings ofDewbre
clearly manifest that this statue is indeed, "clear and unambiguous." Defendant Kelley's

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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clai~ that he did not have notice as to which conduct was proscribed by this statute is
clearly contrary to the specific determination of the Dewbre court. There is no lack of
clarity that LC. §49-808 requires motorists to signal a lane change so Kelly's argument
fails in this regard.
Defendant Kelley also claims that this statute is unconstitutionally vague when
applied to "the facts of this case." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to

Suppress, p. 7. The Burton Court indicated "[t]o succeed on an 'as applied' vagueness
challenge, a complainant must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the
complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines
such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the
complainant." Id. citations omitted. Similarly, Defendant Kelley's claim that the statute
is vague as it is applied fails because there is no confusion as to how a driver on a
freeway or controlled access highway should signal a lane change. Kelley relies on

Burton, supra, for this argument. However, Burton is clearly distinguishable from the
facts of this case. In Burton, the Court of Appeals held that the statute was void as it
applied to situations where two lanes were merging into one lane, however, the Court
noted that the situation in Burton "differs significantly from that where one of two lanes
ends and the other continues" as in the Dewbre case. Burton, at Idaho 749; P.3d at 936.
Similarly, in the current situation, there is no confusion as to whether the signal
requirement applies to the defendant's driving. Defendant Kelly was changing clearly
marked lanes on a fully access controlled interstate highway. The plain language of the
statute renders no confusion as to whether drivers on an interstate should signal for five
seconds or not. Even 14.5 year old student drivers are able to understand this statute and
act accordingly. Thus, Defendant Kelley's claims that this statute is unconstitutionally
vague because the statute fails to provide notice of what conduct is prohibited and
because of how the statute applies to the facts of his situation are incorrect. Accordingly
his motion to suppress on these grounds should be denied.
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IV. REASONABLE INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION FOLLOWING A TRAFFIC
STOP
The mere lack of a warrant does not necessarily violate the defendant's
constitutional right. As clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court,
Not all seizures of the person need be justified by probable cause to arrest for a
crime; a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause for arrest. Such a seizure is justified under
the Fourth Amendment if there is an articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime.

State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992)(citations omitted). See
also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 2868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968). Although the State
acknowledges that by conducting a traffic stop on a motor vehicle the driver of the
vehicle is technically seized or detained, this traffic stop was not an improper seizure. In
the instant case, Trooper Higley observed a traffic infraction committed by the driver of
this vehicle in violation of I.C §49-808(2). "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer
may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is articulable and
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." State v.

Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct.App. 2000)(citations omitted).
Under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure of a driver/passengers in a traffic stop
is treated like an investigative detention and is evaluated on the "totality of the
circumstances then known to the officer."

State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59,266 P.3d

1161, 1164 (Ct.App. 2011). Although the investigative detention necessarily should be
"related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop," the scope of the detention
may be expanded based on events occurring during the scope of the stop. Johnson, Id.
Accordingly, during the course of an investigative detention, "[i]f a police officer's
suspicions are 'confirmed or further aroused, the stop may be prolonged and the scope of
the investigative stop enlarged."' State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292,295
(2000) (quoting State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,877,736 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1987)).
In the instant case, the Trooper observed a traffic infraction which led him to
properly stop the vehicle. However, Trooper Higley's reasonable suspicion was based on
more than a traffic infraction. He had recent information from a reliable source, an
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Oregon State officer, regarding the defendant transporting controlled substances in the
vehicle while traveling toward Boise.· He made observations of the defendant and the
contents of his vehicle, including the visible trunk area which were inconsistent with ·
statements made by the Defendant and inconsistent with information the trooper knew.
Although Defendant Kelley by his motion has made the assertion that there was
an improper seizure of his person related to this stop, or that this was a pre-textual stop,
the facts are inconsistent with that assertion. The reasonableness of detention is
evaluated by a totality of the circumstances then known to the officer. The length of the
detention of the Defendant Kelley was not excessive and was reasonably related in scope
and duration to what Trooper Higley knew before the stop and what he observed and
became aware of during the stop. The traffic stop did not constitute an improper seizure
of Defendant Kelley and was reasonably related in scope to information known to the
o~fi?er during the time of the stop or developed and properly expanded during the stop.

V. SEARCH OF THE TRUNK
The search of Defendant's vehicle occurred after Trooper Higley determined he had
probable cause to believe that Kelley's vehicle contained contraband. This information
was developed by information made available to the trooper by other officers, his own
observations and his expertise and experience with narcotics trafficking and the positive
alert of a trained narcotics dog. Under a totality of the circumstances, when an officer
has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, the automobile exception
permits the warrantless search of the vehicle.
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows law enforcement
officers to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles if they have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). These searches may
include the search of any container within the car if the container could reasonably
contain the suspected contraband or evidence. United States v. Ross, 456 US. 798,
825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 594 (1982). Probable cause is the
possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty. State
v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 137, 922 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1996). When analyzing the
existence of probable cause, this Court must determine whether the facts available to
the officers at the moment of the search warranted a person of reasonable caution to
believe that the action taken was appropriate. Julian, 129 Idaho at 136, 922 P.2d at
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1062; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920,925,523 P.2d 523,528 (1974). The facts
making up the probability are viewed from an objective standpoint. Julian, 129 Idaho
at 136-37, 922 P.2d at 1062-63. Additionally, in passing on the question of probable
cause, the expertise and experience of the officer may be taken into account. State v.
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct.App.1991).

State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865, 870, 172 P.3d 1140, 1145 (Ct.App.2007). Likewise, our
courts have clearly indicated that a positive alert to the odor of a controlled substance by
a trained narcotics detection dog will give an officer probable cause. Florida v. Harris, -- S.Ct. ---, 2013 WL 598440 (February 19, 2013).
It does not appear from Defendant Kelley's brief that he claims that Trooper Higley
d~d not have probable cause to believe there were controlled substances in his car, but
rather, only that even with probable cause to search a vehicle for suspected controlled
s~bstances, the officer may not search the trunk of a vehicle. Kelley's application of
applicable law is incorrect on this issue. In the instant case, the Trooper had probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. The rear seat of the vehicle was
down exposing the trunk in order to accommodate skis leaving the officer able to visually
see into the trunk from outside the vehicle, and likely comingling any odors of narcotics
to the entire interior of the vehicle. "The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather it
is d~fined by the object of the search and the places in which there is- probable. cause to
believe it may be found." State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,210,226 P.3d 1220, 1225
(Ct.App.2011) citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d
572 (1982).
Moreover, in State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 71 P.3d 1072 (Ct.App.2003) a
defendant challenged the search of his vehicle, and specifically the trunk, incident to
arrest. As is with the present case, in Veneroso the trunk compartment was
visible/partially visible to law enforcement outside the car. The Idaho Court of Appeals
declined to address Veneroso' s claim that a search incident to arrest did not allow the
search of the trunk, stating: "we conclude that the trunk search was lawful under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Under the automobile exception, police
officers may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have cause to
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believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Id. Idaho at
939; P.3d at 1076 (citations omitted).

In the instant case Trooper Higley had probable cause to believe that the vehicle may
-

contain narcotics - the exposed trunk area as well as the interior portion of the vehicle.
Accordingly, the search of the trunk was not improper.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Kelley claims that LC. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague and therefore this
traffic stop was invalid. He is wrong. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to
give notice of the prohibited conduct or if the statute is vague on how it is applied to
individuals in a particular fact pattern.
changing lanes.

This statue clearly requires a signal before

Likewise the statute clearly applies to all motorists on interstate

highways, controlled access highways, traveling at high speeds and requiring them to
signal for no less than five seconds. Neither the prescribed conduct nor the application as
to the length of a required signal is vague in this case.

Defendant has failed to

demonstrate unconstitutional vagueness and his motion should be denied.
Defendant Kelley also claims that the officer unreasonably extended the length of
his detention. Trooper Higley had knowledge from other officers before and during this
stop, coupled with irregular and inconsistent statements by the defendant and visual
observations the officer made while at the side of the vehicle properly extended the
length of the detention for this officer to investigate his reasonable suspicions that
criminal activity was occurring. The length of the detention was not improper.
Fina!ly, Defendant Kelley seemingly acknowledges that the positive alert of the
trained narcotics detention dog to his vehicle gave the officer probable cause to search his
vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; however, Kelley
complains that the officer's search should not have included a search of his trunk area.
This argument is simply not consistent with Idaho law.
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Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the court dismiss the defendant's
motion to dismiss.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \~August 2013.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

\Af~ay of August 2013, I caused to

be served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress upon the individual(s) named below
in the manner noted:
Name and address: Gerald Bublitz, 501 W. Grove St., Boise, ID 83702

f.. .By

depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first

class.

o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available
for pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:
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[I COPY

....

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Kari L. Higbee
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION FOR SEARCH
WARRANT.

_______________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

)
) ss:
)

Trooper Blake Higley of the Idaho State Police, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a duly appointed, qualified, and acting peace officer within the County of Ada,
State ofidaho, and that he has reason to believe that certain evidence of the crime(s) of Trafficking
in Marijuana, Delivery of a Controlled Substance; Possession of a Controlled Substance wi~ Intent
to Deliver; and/or Possession of Controlled Substance and/or Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of
Idaho Code §37-2732 to-wit: Any evidence of the described crimes contained in the memory or call
history of the cell phones, including any names, phone numbers, addresses, contact information,

..

data, text messages, emails, instant messages (SM), images, videos, photographs, screen name lists,
a "buddy" list, or other information relating to communications or contacts with individuals
regarding the planning and/or coordinating criminal activity, contained in any address book, speed
dial, calendar, call history, or other part of the cellular phone, SIM -card or its memory; any and all
electronic accounting record(s), in the forn1 of computer generated logs of criminal activity,
including, but not limited to, diaries, journals, calendars, or computer system audit records;
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electronic mail messages, opened and unopened, to or from co-conspirators, associates, or victims;
electroni~ chat room logs, and other electronic logs, of communications with co-conspirators,
associates, or victims; computer account information, including but not limited to computer host
names and Internet addresses, account names, passwords, access telephone numbers, password
files, and other information about computer systems, users, accounts and related topics, and
documents that show ownership and control are located in the following described property, to-wit:

Cellular Phone: Verizon LG, black in color, using unknown phone number,
believed to belong to Thomas C KELLEY (
). The Serial Number
recorded on the back of the phone is 107CYMR0998683. The phone is listed as
exhibit No. 05 on Idaho State Police report Bl3001161. The phone is currently
located in an evidence locker at the lSP Region 3 Patrol and Investigations Office at
700 Stratford Rd. Meridian, Ada County, Idal10.

That he has probable cause to believe and is positive the same is true because of the
following facts of which he has personal knowledge:
Your affiant is employed as a Trooper with the Idaho State Police and has been since May
of 2008. Your affiant has completed the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training Academy
(P.O.S.T.), Idal10 State Police Academy, Pipeline and DIAP Interdiction Training and other
Training in Law Enforcement type classes, with approximately 1800 total P.O.S.T. training hours.
Your affiant holds an Intermediate Certificate from the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training
Council. 1his initial training also included a course designed to prepare your affiant to recognize
common signals or indicators of the presence of controlled substances on a person or within a
vehicle, how to visually identify various controlled substances (methamphetarnine, cocaine,
marijuana, and heroin), and how to recognize physical manifestations of controlled substance use in
the field.
During the course of his law enforcement career, your affiant has been involved in
investigations of the distribution and/or manufacture of marijuana and other drugs.· Your affiant has
participated as

a surveillance officer during

a prior controlled purchase of controlled substance.

Your affiant has participated in the execution of search warrants related to devices used in
controlled substance transactions, such as cellular phones, computers, and Global Positioning
Systems.
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Your affiant's training related to investigations for controlled substances includes a course
taught by the Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) called the ''Pipeline" course. This course
· . was a three-day course related specifically to criminal and drug enforcement interdiction.

It

highlighted investigative tactics and considerations related to motor vehicles used to transport or
deliver controlled substances.
During the course of his law enforcement career, your affiant has been involved m
investigations of the distribution and/or manufacture of marijuana and other drugs. As a State
Trooper, your affiant has participated in or executed multiple search and seizure warrants.
Your affiant knows, based on his training and experience, that persons involved in the
illegal sales and distribution of Marijuana and/or other drugs often use cell phones to communicate
with persons to whom they sell their Marijuana and/or other drugs. Your affiant also knows that
persons involved in the illegal sales and distribution of Marijuana and/or other drugs use cell
phones to communicate with persons that are the source of supply for their Marijuana and/or other
drugs.
Your affiant knows that evidence of Marijuana and/or other drug distribution and sales is
often found in cellular phones used by those who buy and sell drugs. Drug dealers often use
cellular phones to communicate with buyers and suppliers.

They sometimes store contact

information in address books, speed dial lists, or in other areas of the phone.

These

communications can occur through typical telephone calls or through instant messaging or text
messages. To the extent that criminals use services such as instant messaging or text messages,
these messages can sometimes be found on the cellular phone itself. Criminals also use cellular
phones to document criminal activities both by photographs as well as digital memos.
Your affiant knows that these images and memos are also stored on the handset or SIM
(Subscriber Identity Module).
Your affiant knows that people involved in the distribution of Marijuana and/or other
drugs often store phone numbers, names and nicknames of both their suppliers and potential
customers. Your affiant knows that cell phones contain pictures of illegal activities as well as text
and voice messages that are related to Marijuana and/or other drug distribution. Your affiant
knows that devices such as these phones can store a large number of phone numbers and call
history and some mobile phones can also contain contact information.
contain images.

Camera phones can

This information can be valuable evidence in determining if there are other
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participants in a criminal enterprise. Further, your affiant knows that images in a camera can
contain evidence of where a subject has been and with whom the subject has associated.
Your affiant knows from training and experience that cellular telephones are capable of
holding several types of digital files to include movies and pictures. Technology in the cellular
telephone industry has phones capable of accessing the Internet, and is capable of running a
v~riety of software applications. With the cellular telephone users can gain access to several of
the same types of digital media that can be accessed with a computer. As such, your affiant
needs to examine the cellular telephones described in this affidavit for further contraband and
criminal activity.

CURRENT INVESTIGATION
On April 19, 2013 at approximately 0020 hours, your affiant stopped a green colored Honda
Civic (California registration 6SAS345) on eastbound Interstate 84 at approximately milepost 50 in
Ada County, Idaho. Your affiant observed the vehicle signal briefly, approximately two seconds,
and more to the right. The vehicle failed to signal for the required five seconds. This maneuver was
in violation of Idaho Code §49-808, which requires a motorist on highway to signal for five (5)
continuous seconds before any movement right or left or entering/exiting a highway. Your affiant
approached the vehicle and made contact with the driver identified by his New Hampshire Driver's
License as Thomas C KELLEY (

). Your affiant observed KELLEY was nervous,

and exhibited this through his talking. KELLEY's travel plans did not malce sense. KELLEY also
advised he had been stopped and search by law _enfo_rcement earlier for over two hours. KELLEY
also stated it took him approximately one hour to put the contents of his vehicle back after the
search. Your a:ffiant could see KELLEY had very little luggage, as the rear seat was folded down,
allovdng him to look into the trunk area.

Your affiant observed KELLEY had reddened

conjunctiva, and eyelid tremors, consistent with marijuana use. KELLEY denied using marijuana,
and denied consent to search his vehicle. A drug detecting canine was requested to assist. Boise
Police Officer M. Plaisted arrived on scene with his drug detecting canine "Turk". Officer Plaisted
advised "Turk" had alerted on the vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed three large vacuum
packed bags of a green leafy substance which I recognized as marijuana. A small Tupperware was
also located with a small amount of marijuana inside (4.9 Grams). The bags were located under the
trunk floor,. near the spare tire. Your affiant advised KELLEY he was under arrest for Trafficking a
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Controlled Substance (in violation ofldaho Code 37-2732B (I) (A)). KELLEY was transported to
the Ada County Jail. In addition to the contraband seized, a black cellular phone was removed from
the vehicle. Total weight of the three vacuum sealed bags was 3.2lbs. Your affiant tested the
contents of one of the bags using a Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK). The test was presumptive
positive for marijuana.

THEREFORE, your Affiant has probable cause and is positive that said property and
evidence. described herein is concealed within the above-described property and therefore prays
that a Search Warrant be issued. Your affiant further prays that this search warrant order that the
items seized may be submitted for analysis, examination and comparison. Your affiant further
prays that this search warrant order that a search of items seized include the contents of the
items' internal, removable, or other memory held within. Your affiant further prays that this
search warrant grant authorization to open closed containers.

Trooper Blake Higley
Idaho State Police

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before your affiant this _ _ day o f - - - - ~
20

Magistrate
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CONFLICT POINT - An area where intersecting traffic either merges, diverges, or
crosses.
CONGESTION - A restriction or interference to the normal free flow of travel.
"Congestion" is directly related to VOLUME such that as traffic volumes increase,
congestion in_creases.
CONSTRUCTION - Build new or modify existing facilities, other than maintenance.
CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAY - Any highway or roadway where access to or
from abutting properties is restricted by the public authority having the jurisdiction.
CORNER CLEARANCE -The distance along the curb line or outside edge of the
shoulder measured from the beginning or end of the intersecting roadway flare to the
nearest edge of the adjacent approach, excluding flares or transitions (see Figures 1.5.1
and 1.5.2).
DEPARTMENT - The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD).
DIRECTOR - The director of the Idaho Transportation Department, or a delegated
representative.
DISTANCE BETWEEN APPROACHES-The distance measured along the curb line
or outside edge of the shoulder between the nearest edges of adjacent approaches,
excluding the flares, transitions, or radii (see Figures 1.5.1 and 1.5.2).
DISTRICT - An administrative and maintenance subdivision of the Idaho
Transportation Department encompassing a particular geographical region of the State of
Idaho.
DISTRICT ENGINEER - The administrator of an Idaho Transportation Department
administrative district, or a delegated representative.
DRILLING - Creating a path for a casing(s) through the use of an approved mechanical
method.
DRIVING - A mechanical means to forcibly install a casing without the means of
drilling or boring.
EMERGENCY - As used in this manual, any unscheduled work required to correct or
prevent a hazardous situation that poses an imminent threat to life or property.
ENCROACHMENT - Any authorized or unauthorized use of highway right-of-way or
easements or the air space immediately above the highway right-of-way.
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ENGINEER - A professional engineer licensed in the State ofldaho.
EXCHANGE DEED - A legal document of title, between the Idaho Transportation
Department and the owner of real property, transferring and describing a property right
(easement, usage, access, etc.).
FARMING - See AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES.
FHWA - The Federal Highway Administration, a division of the U. S. Department of
Transportation.
FIBEROPTIC CABLE -A cable containing one or more glass or plastic fibers that has
the ability to transmit light along its axis.
FIELD APPROACH - An approach that serves only non-residential agricultural
property, including farmyards.
FIXTURE - Any sign, guard rail, bridge, tunnel, or other appurtenances placed within
the highway right-of-way.
FLARE TANGENT DISTANCE-The distance of the approach radius measured along
the edge of pavement (see Figure 1.5.2).
FRONTAGE -The distance measured along the highway right-of-way line between the
frontage boundary lines of property that is contiguous to highway right-of-way (see
Figures 1.5.1 and 1.5.2).
FRONTAGE ROAD - A road auxiliary to and located to the side of the highway for
service to abutting properties and adjacent areas for the purpose of controlling access to
the highway.
FRONTAGE BOUNDARY LINE - A line perpendicular to the highway centerline that
begins at the point of intersection of the abutting property line and the highway right-ofway line (see Figures 1.5.1 and 1.5.2).
FULL CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAY - Any section of a highway system
where access is prohibited except for interchange connections.
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION - A grouping of highways by the character of
service (access and mobility) they provide. These include, but are not limited to, a minor
collector, major collector, minor arterial, principal arterial, and interstate as defined in the
latest edition of the Highway Functional Classification Manual by the U. S. Department
of. Transportation, FHW A.
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES-As used in this manual, includes federal, state, county,
city, or local highway jurisdictions.
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GRADE. SEPARATIONS - A structure separating the elevations of two or more
intersecting roads above or below a highway.
HIGHWAY(S) - The entire width between the boundary lines of every main traveled
way publicly maintained when any part is open to use by the public for vehicular travel,
with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property line, including sidewalks, shoulders,
berms, and rights-of-way not intended for motorized traffic. The term "street" is
interchangeable with highway. Also, roads, streets, alleys, and bridges laid out or
established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall
include necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining
walls, bridges, tunnels, grade separation structures, roadside improvements, adjacent
lands, or interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works,
or fixtures incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways. Roads laid out
and recorded as highways, by order of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as
such for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at
the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners,
are highways.
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY - Property rights to land generally designated for
transportation purposes, open to the public, and under the jurisdiction of a Public
Highway Agency.
IDAPA - the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.
IMMINENT THREAT - Includes major traffic control deficiencies or safety situations
that are likely to result in serious injury or loss of life.
INTERSTATE HIGHWAY - As identified by federal code, a part of the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highway System. An FHWA-approved arterial
highway, freeway, or expressway with a fully controlled access, and having medians,
grade separations at cross roads, and ramp connections for entrance to and exit from the
traveled way.
ITD - The Idaho Transportation Department.
JACKING - A method of providing an opening for drainage or other purposes
underground, by cutting an opening ahead of the pipe and forcing the pipe into the
opening by means of horizontal jacks.
JETTING - Drilling with high pressure water or air jets.
JOINT-USE APPROACH -An approach constructed at a common boundary between
adjacent properties that abut the highway. A joint-use approach is equally owned and
shared as common access by both property owners.
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LANDLOCKED PARCEL - A parcel of land without a legal right to access.
LANDSCAPING - Any action taken to change the features or appearance of the
highway right-of-way or abutting property with plants, soil, rock, and related material.
LEAN CONCRETE BACKFILL - An approved concrete mixture using cement, water,
sand, and aggregate material used to replace excavated material (see the current special
provision for Trenching).
LEVEL OF SERVICE - A qualitative measure describing operational conditions within
a traffic stream, generally described in terms of such factors as speed and travel time,
freedom to maneuver, traffic interruptions, comfort and convenience, and safety (see
CAPACITY, CONGESTION, and VOLUME).
LOADED RATE - As used in this manual, includes hourly wages plus the cost of
associated benefits.
LOCAL AUTHORITY - See LOCAL HIGHWAY AGENCY.
LOCAL HIGHWAY AGENCY - Any city, county, highway district or other local
board or body having authority to enact regulations, resolutions, and/or ordinances
relating to traffic on the highways, highway rights-of-way, and streets within their
respective jurisdiction.
LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION - A county, city, or highway district with
jurisdiction over a highway system.
LOCAL ISSUING AUTHORITY - See LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION.
LOCAL ROAD-A city, county, or highway district highway whose primary function is
to provide access to adjacent properties.
LOGO SIGNS - Signs giving specific information in the interest of the traveling public
along interstate highways and other fully controlled access highways.
MAINTENANCE - The continuous work or in kind replacement that is required to keep
any encroachment within the highway right-of-way from deterioration due to wear and
tear, and to preserve the general character of the original improvement without alteration
of any of its component factors.
MAJOR COLLECTOR - Any public highway designated as a route to provide traffic
circulation and collect traffic from local roads within residential neighborhoods and
commercial and industrial areas and channel it into the arterial system.
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MEDIAN - The portion of a divided highway or approach that separates opposing
traveled ways. Medians may be raised, flush, or depressed relative to the roadway
surface, and may be landscaped or paved.
· MEDIAN OPENING - A paved area bisecting opposite directions of a divided roadway
that is designed to permit traffic to cross at least one direction of travel.
MEMORIAL -An object established in memory of an event or person(s).
MINOR COLLECTOR - These roads are located only in rural areas, are off the State
Highway System, and are subject to local highway jurisdiction.
MINOR ARTERIAL - Any rural or urban public highway designated as a route that
provides substantial corridor movement with trip length arid density suitable for linking
cities, counties, states, and other traffic generators.
MULTIPLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL - A single parcel of land containing more than
one residence (i.e., duplexes, apartments, trailers).
MUTCD - The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways,
latest edition, as adopted by the Idaho Transportation Board in accordance with Idaho
Code 49-201(3). A manual written by the Federal Highway Administration that sets
national minimum standards for signing, striping, and traffic control devices.
NATIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM (NHS) - The system of federal-aid highways,
urban and rural, designated and approved in accordance with the provisions of 23 U. S.
C. 103(b).
NCHRP-350 - A National Cooperative Highway Research Program report that provides
testing procedures that evaluate the safety and crash worthiness of roadway features and
traffic control devices on the National Highway System and the State Highway System.
NON-STANDARD APPROACH - Any approach that does not meet Department
standards.
OFFSET - A distance measured at right angles to the left or right of the highway
centerline.
PARK or PARKING - As used in this manual, the temporary stopping of a vehicle,
wh.ether occupied or not, for purposes other than emergencies, unless authorized.
PARTIAL CONTROL OF ACCESS IDGHWAY -Any section of the State Highway
System that has restrictions placed on any encroachment within the State highway rightof-way.
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Introduction to Controlled
Access H·g ways
• Plans for the "Interstate
System," began in the late
1930s
• The system was created in
1956 and named for
President Dwight
Eisenhower
• Without a system of
interstate highways, life in
America would be far
different
- It would be more risky,
less prosperous, and
lacking in the efficiency
and comfort that
Americans now enjoy
and take for granted
Source: The US Interstate Highway System: 40 Year Report
American Highway Users Alliance., June 1996

M13 • 2
April 2005

000072

Characteristics
• The words "limited" and "controlled" access highways
are interchangeable with "freeways" and "expressways"
- Travel on these highways is limited to motor vehicles
- Drivers are limited as to where they can enter and exit
• Drivers have minimum and maximum speed limits
• Opposing traffic has some type of barrier {median grass
strip, guardrail, concrete wall, etc.)
• There are multiple lanes in both directions
• They are designed to carry lots of traffic quickly and
efficiently
• Distance between entrance and exit locations may only
be a mile apart or many miles apart

M13 • 3
April 2005
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Charact ristics
• The U.S. Interstate Highway System has enriched the
quality of life for every American
-- It provides virtually all Americans with the ability
to move quickly to any destination within their
communities and to travel throughout the nation,
inexpensively, and at whatever time or date they
desire

Photo courtesy of http://americanhistory.si.edu/onthemove/exhibition/exhibition_16_7.html
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Character·stics
• There is a high
injury severity rate
when a collision
occurs because of
the higher speeds
• On Idaho's
interstates, 2,460
collisions occurred
during 2004
causing 38 fatalities

Photo courtesy of AAA Foundation
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• Emergency crossovers on limited access
roadways are restricted to emergency or law
enforcement vehicles only
• Driving in these restricted areas can result in
a large fine

Photo courtesy of http://www.photodiary.org/kw_freeway.shtml
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To I

oads and Bri ges

• Roads and bridges are generally
paid for with fuel taxes
• From 1864 to 1872 Idaho was
completely dependent on toll roads
and bridges
• Idaho chartered toll companies to
build and maintain roads and
bridges
• There were so many toll roads and
bridges, The Legislature received
complaints that tolls were seriously
eating into their profits
• The system was abolished in 1872
• Yankee Jim's National Park Toll
Road in Park County was the last toll
road in Idaho

The Snowden Bridge over
the Missouri River charged
tolls until 1956

M13 • 7
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Hi h Occupancy V hicle (HOV) Lanes
•

•

High-Occupancy
Vehicle (HOV) lanes
allow vehicles with
two or more people
to use diamond and
express lanes
The goal of HOV
lanes is to use the
current freeway
system more
efficiently and to
provide a quicker,
more reliable trip to
those who car pool

M13 • 8
April 2005
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ADVA

AG S O LI ITED ACCESS

• Collision and fatality rates
are lower
• Cross traffic is not
present
• Opposing traffic is
separated by a barrier

OAD

• There are no stops
• Signs are large and
placed well in advance
• Higher speed limits allow
for fast, efficient travel

M13 • 9
April 2005
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DISADVA TAGES OF CO TROLLED
A CESS H GHWAYS
• Lane selection is critical
• Increased stopping
distance
• Small driving errors can
be disastrous
• Different size and weight
of vehicles adds
additional challenges
• Rush hour congestion

M13 • 10
April 2005
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H·ghway Hypno is
• A dull or drowsy condition
that can occur because of
the concentration needed
while driving long
distances
• It becomes worse when
the driver's eyes focus on
the yellow line

REST

• Plan breaks and rest stops to
combat highway hypnosis
• Pull to a safe area for rest and
sleep when tired

1
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Ve ocitation

• Unknowingly accelerating to a
higher speed while driving is
known as velocitation
• When driving at faster speeds
for a period of time the body
adjusts and causes the driver
to think the vehicle is going
slower than it actually is
Photo courtesy of AAA Foundation
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CLOVERLEAF INTERCHANGE
Allows for
interchange of
two expressways
.
or maJor
roadways

Allows minimal
disruption of
speed or
movement

000083

M13 • 13
April 2005

DIAMO D I TE CHA GE
Allows for
interchange of a
major roadway
with a secondary
dual or multiple
lane roadway

Little room available for
left turns onto freeway
Traffic can build up on
the ramps creating
congestion

M13 • 14
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u

E I TE C A GE

Allows for interchange
of secondary two-way
streets to a multiple
lane roadway with
minimal traffic mix

M13 • 15
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0 TAG

AD I TE

HAG

Allows for interchange
of vehicles using
parallel secondary twoway or one-way
roadways and a major
multiple-lane roadway

Allows drivers to exit a multiple-lane roadway and
use the opposing frontage road to enter the
multi-lane roadway in the opposite direction
M13 • 16
April 2005
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SAFETY DES GNS

•
•
•
•
•

Pedestrians, animals, non-motorized vehicles, and slow
moving vehicles are prohibited
Fences restrict pedestrian and animal traffic
Wide shoulders and underpasses
Curves are banked
Sharp curves and steep grades are reduced or eliminated

M13 • 17
April 2005
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SAFE Y DESIG S
•

Breakaway support on signs
and light poles are designed
to break when struck by a
vehicle
- Lessening the damage to
the vehicle and injury to
the occupants

•

Rumble Strips are
corrugated road sections
used to alert the driver
through the noise tires make
when driven over them
- Warn of approaching
hazards
- Alert the driver that they
are leaving the lane

Photo courtesy of
http://www.aaroads.com
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SAFETY DE IGNS
•

Guardrails prevent vehicles that •
leave the roadway from impact
with retaining walls, fences, or
other vehicles

Crash barrels lessen the impact
if a vehicle collides with a
bridge or overpass support

M13 • 19
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SAFETY DESIG S
• Changeable message signs warn drivers of traffic
accidents, stalled vehicles, or other traffic
problems

M13 • 20
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SAFETY DESIG S

• Runaway truck ramps
are on downhill grades
for use by large, semitractor trailers that have
lost brake power and
are unable to stop

M13 • 21
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INTERSTATES IN Idaho
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SG S
Interstate sign
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INT

STATE HIGHWAY

• Even numbers go
east-west (1-90, 1-94)
• Odd numbers go
north-south (1-15)
• Numbers begin in
the west and get
larger as they move
east
• Alternate routes are
usually three-digit

UMBERS

I,i f

Hr

I

I

I

I f
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IN E STA E

IGHWAY

UMBERS

• If the first digit is even, the alternate route
goes around the city
• If it is odd, it leads into the city (1-184)

M13 • 25
April 2005
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Lane Markings
• Lane markings on
expressways mean the
same as on any other
roadway
• The HOV marking is
unique to high
occupant vehicles

M13 • 26
April 2005
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• The speed limit on limited access highways in
Idaho is 75 mph outside urban areas of 50,000
population and 65 mph within urban areas of
50,000 population
• These fixed speed limits are based on optimal
road/weather conditions

Source: Idaho Drivers Manual
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ILE

ARKE S

• Usually green or white and have
the word MILE along with a number
- some just have the number
• Mile markers show the number of
miles from where the Interstate
route entered a state
• The counting always begins at the
state line in the south (for northsouth routes) and in the west (for
east-west routes)
• Mile marker numbers always get
larger as drivers travel east or
north

M13 • 28
April 2005
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MILE MA K

s

• Knowing how to read mile
markers can help drivers know
exactly where they are in their
destination
• Watching these numbers will be
useful if a driver needs to call for
assistance by giving an exact
location
• Exit numbers will be the same
number as the mile marker as
shown in the two pictures
• Mile markers on roads off the
Interstate system exist, however,
the numbering system may be
different from state to state-or
even county to county
M13 • 29
April 2005
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LEGAL AUTHORITY

I.

LEGAL AUTHORITY
· RULE NO. 39.03.62 of the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT establishes
the following:
1.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

Under the authority of Sections 40-312, 40-313, 40-1911(5) and 67-5229 Idaho Code and
U.S. Code Title 23, Chapter 1, Parts 625 and 655, the Idaho Transportation Board
incorporates by reference its March, 2007 publication entitled "Logo Signs"

2.

TITLE AND SCOPE

The publication provides regulations for the installation and administration of Specific
Service signs giving information in the interest of the traveling public informing
motorists of gas, food, lodging, camping, attraction and 24-hour pharmacy facilities with
their related tourist services which are accessible from eligible interchanges.

5
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GENERAL PROVISIONS

II.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to provide standard operating procedures for installation
and administration of Specific Service signs informing motorists about the availability of
· Gas, Food, Lodging, Camping, Attraction and 24-Hour Pharmacy facilities that are
. accessible from eligible interchanges.
The intent of the logo sign program is to provide the availability of specific service
signage to a business or activity that offers specific motorist services that are of interest
to the traveling public. It is the sole intent of this program to provide motorist
information to the traveling public and not to promote outdoor advertising of a business
or activity.

2.

DEFINITIONS

. The following definitions shall apply throughout this document unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise:
"24-Hour Pharmacy" - A licensed facility that is continuously operated 24 hours per
day, 7 days per week having a State-licensed pharmacist present and on duty at all times
for the dispensing of a prescribed drug or device.
· "Approach" - That section of the highway right-of-way between the outside edge of
shoulder and the right-of-way line which is designed as a roadway for the movement of
vehicles between the highway and the adjoining property.
"Attraction" - A tourist-oriented facility whose primary purpose is to provide
amusement, historical, cultural, or leisure activities to the public.
"Authorized operator" - A person or entity, other than an owner, who operates an
independent motorist service facility and who has authority to enter into agreements
relevant to matters covered by this document.
"Camping" - An area designed to accommodate but not limited to any combination of
tents, pickup campers, camp trailers, fifth wheel trailers, or motor homes.
"Conditionally Qualified" -- A facility run as a profit or non-profit business to provide
' tourist oriented services, attractions or activities to road users that cannot meet all criteria
· for specific service signing. The Department may approve conditional status for a logo
facility if the Department determines that signing of the facility would benefit the
motorist.
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GENERAL PROVISIONS

"Department" - The Idaho Transportation Department.
"District" - Any Idaho Transportation Department district facility.
"Facility" - A facility run as a profit or non-profit business to provide tourist oriented
services, attractions or activities to road users.
"Food court" - Any facility with two or more food businesses sharing a common seating
area that serve food to the public as their primary source of revenue.
"Food facility" - Any business that serves food to the public as their primary source of
revenue.
"Fully controlled access highway" - Any section of a highway system where access is
. prohibited except for interchange connections.
"Gas court" - Any facility with two or more gas businesses sharing a common service
island or fuel storage.
"Gas facility" - Any business that serves gas to the public as their primary source of
revenue.
"Interchange" -A ramped access point to or from a fully controlled access highway.
"Interstate highway system" - Every State highway that is a part of a national system
of interstate and defense highways established pursuant to Title 23, Section 103 (e), U.S.
Code.
"Logo" - An identification symbol or trademark or a word message for a qualified
motorist service facility.
"Logo panel" - A separate affixed sign attached to a Specific Service sign displaying the
logo for a qualified motorist service facility.
"Main traveled way" - The through traffic lanes of the highway system that are fully
controlled access highways.
"MUTCD" -Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.
"Owner" - The holder of fee title, or holder of leasehold estates from the owner of the
real property.
"Pharmacy" - See 24-Hour Pharmacy.
"Regional significance" - Facilities that attract continuous motorist attendance from
locations extending beyond the borders of Idaho.

7
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Parking on a Hill
To keep your vehicle from rolling into traffic when parked on a hill, tum
your front wheels (1 ) sharply toward and against the curb or edge of the
road if you are facing downhill , or (2) if you are facing uphill , tum your
wheels sharply away and against the curb (if there is no curb, tum the heels
sharply toward the edge of the road) .

No-Parking Zones
Parking is not allowed:
• On sidewalks.
• On the street side of any parked vehicle. (This is known as "double
parking .")
• In intersections .
• Within 50 feet of railroad tracks.
• On bridges or overpasses.
• In front of a driveway.
• Within 15 feet of a fire hydrant.
• Within 20 feet of a crosswalk.
• Within 30 feet of a stop sign, yield sign, or
traffic signal.
• Within 20 feet of a fire station driveway .
• On any controlled-access highway (freeway).
• Where prohibited by signs or a red , yellow, or
white "no parking" curb.

Handicapped Parking
The symbol shown here indicates parking spaces reserved for handicapped
persons. Vehicles displaying this symbol on their license plate or a special
card may park in handicapped spaces. Non-handicapped drivers are
prohibited from parking in such spaces and may be fined for violations. A
handicapped person may park automobiles dis playing the handicapped
symbol in public parking spaces without paying and for unlimited time.

2-8
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Using Your Turn Signals
Always give a turn signal when you:
• Change lanes or pass another vehicle.
• Turn at an intersection or into a driveway.
• Enter or leave a freeway or interstate highway .
• Pull away from a parked position along a road or street to enter the
traffic lane.
• Pull over to the side of the road .
Proper signalling may prevent a rear-end collision. Signals must start at
least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on freeways
or highways) before you turn or change lanes . If you plan to turn just
beyond an intersection , signal just after you pass through the intersection so
you won't confuse other drivers. You may use either electric tum signals or
arm signals .
The correct arm signals are:
• Left: Your arm and hand extended straight out the window.
• Right: Your arm and hand extended upward out the window .
• Stop: Your arm and hand extended downward out the window
(see illustration below).
You must signal before every turn or lane change .

;

'

'

--~
Left Turn

Right Turn

Left turns.

Slow or Stop

Right turns.
2-9
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"open range," which means almost all areas outside of city
limits and herd districts upon which livestock by custom,
license , lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam. The
presence of fences does not necessarily mean that animals are
not present or do not have the right of way. Be especially
careful driving at night. If you strike and injure or kill livestock or domestic
animals that are on the open range or under controlled movement, the
owner of the animal(s) is not liable for damages to you or your vehicle.
You may be liable for the injuries or death of the animal if you are found to
have been negligent.
OPEN CONTAINER LAW
It is against the law for any person in a motor vehicle on a public roadway
to drink alcoholic beverages , or to transport open (unsealed) containers of
alcoholic beverages. It is a misdemeanor for a driver in actual physical
control of a vehicle to violate the open container law- it is an infraction for
passengers. An unsealed alcoholic beverage container may be legally
transported in the enclosed trunk compartment or behind the last upright
seat of a vehicle without a trunk compartment. Passengers may drink and
possess alcoholic beverages in the passenger area of a vehicle designed ,
maintained, or primarily used to "transport people for compensation," or in
the living quarters of a recreational vehicle.

Other Laws You Need to Know
• Lights: Headlamps and taillamps must be lighted from sunset to
sunrise and when poor visibility makes them necessary for safety.
Headlamps must be dimmed 500 feet before meeting and 200 feet
before overtaking another vehicle. When lights are needed for
driving, use headlamps, not parking lights.
• Median Strip: It's illegal to drive across a barrier or unpaved strip
that separates two halves of a roadway except at an authorized
opening or crossover. This is not allowed on Interstate highways
(freeways)-crossovers are for emergency vehicles only.
• Racing: It's illegal to engage in any vehicle race , speed
exhibition , or speed contest on any public road, street, or highway .
• Driving on Sidewalks : Driving on sidewalks is prohibited except
to cross into or out of a driveway or alley.
• Keep Windows and Windshield Clear: Windows and
windshields must be kept clean of signs, posters, and stickers
except those required by law. You must also clean windows of ice,
snow, or dirt before driving to ensure that you have maximum
visibility in all directions.
• Backing: Backing is always prohibited on freeways, expressways,
and other controlled-access highways including the shoulder.
Elsewhere, backing is prohibited unless it can be done safely and
2-11
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Courtroom504

Hansen, Miren, 08/19/13, Gromwell

Time

Speaker

Note

12:38:09 PM!
!State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250
3:00:32 PM jstate Attorney jBen Harmer
~

~

3:00:42 PM !Defense
!Jessica Bublitz
!Attorney
3:00:48 PM !Judge Hansen Jcalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel

l

3:01 :23 PM 1Defense
!will be requesting a continuance
!Attorney
!
3:01 :46 PM fstate Attorney Jno objection
3:01.:54 .. PM lJudge Hansen lwith.. the acknowledment from the State of the late filling - will grant
!
(the motion to continue the suppression motion - does have some
l
!time for speedy trial - the Court can hear the motion to suppress
l
lon 09/11/13 at 3:00 p.m. - will caution that the trial date may be in
!danger of being rescheduled

I

l

3:05: 16 PM Defense
Jwill be asking for time to file a reply to the State's response
\Attorney
l
3:05:27 PM fJudge Hansen fwill give Ms. Bublitz until 09/04/13 at 5:00 p.m. for final reply
~

i

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,0, .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .

3:06:33 PM !

I

8/19/2013

!END CASE
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AUG 3 0·2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jill Longhurst
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

----------)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO LIMIT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS TO ISSUES IDENTIFIED
BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS
MOTION/BRIEF

COMES NOW, Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and moves this

court for and order limiting the Defendant's argument and evidence to legal issues
specifically identified by the defendant in his motion to suppress.
On July 18, 2013 the Defendant filed a "Motion to Suppress and Notice of
Hearing." State's Exhibit One, attached. On the same day, Defendant Kelley also filed a
"Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress." State's Exhibit Two,
attached.
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES
1
IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANT IN ms MOTION/BRIEF (KELLEY), Page000112

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress does not specify what evidence he seeks to
suppress nor the reasons for the motion. Defendant's document merely reads: "Comes
now the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, ... and moves this Court for an
order to suppress statements and evidence in the above entitled case." I.C.R. 47 requires
a motion to "state the grounds upon which the motion is made and shall set forth the relief
or order sought." Defendant Kelley's motion fails to do so. In State v. Holland, 135
Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000) the Idaho Supreme Court refused to address the appeal of
issues the defendant did not completely raise during her suppression hearing stating:
Idaho Criminal Rule 47 requires that a motion contain the ground for granting the
motion. Holland's motion contains only one ground for suppressing the evidence: the
pre se illegality of a warrantless search. A challenge to a warrantless search, however,
does not automatically bring into issue the justification of the initial stop. Indeed, the
law of searches and seizures are as different as they are similar. Therefore, Holland
did not expressly raise the issue of the stop in the trial court.

Holland at Idaho 161; P.3d 1169.
I.C.R. 47 requires that a moving party give fair notice to the opposing side and
clearly and specifically give the court notice of the motion and the legal reasons therefore.
As noted by the Holland court, there are many divergent claims under the law of search
and seizure. Fairness and due process require a moving party to give both notice of the
issue and the grounds. Motions to suppress are not fishing expeditions wherein the
defendant can raise any claim he wishes without prior notice.
Defendant Kelle~ did provide the court with a memorandum in support of his
motion. Defendant Kelley by his motion asks the court for an order suppressing "all
statements and evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure" p. 1;
however, the defendant does not articulate with any specificity which evidence or any
actual statements in his memorandum. This memorandum fails to clarify or state any
"issues" to be addresses.
In the argument portion of his memorandum, the Defendant does identify three
specific areas of the law upon which he, presumably, believes support his motion to

OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES
2
IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS MOTION/BRIEF (KELLEY), Page000113

suppress. These are: First, that LC. §49-808(2) is void for vagueness. p. 3. Second, a
claim that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the length of the traffic stop,
p. 7. Third, that there is no probable cause to justify the search of the trunk area, p. 8.
Based on these three topics outlined by the defendant in his memorandum, the State is on
notice that the defendant intends to ask the court to suppress some unspecified evidence
for these reasons alone.
Accordingly, the State moves this court for an order limiting the Defendant's
argument and evidentiary presentations to the three issues for which he provided notice
and only to those issues. Defendant's failure to comply with I.C.R. 47 and vague
references to the laws of search and seizure should not permit the Defendant to surprise
the State or the Court and raise issues heretofore unannounced.
Alternatively, the State moves the Court for an order requiring the Defendant to
file a supplemental motion to suppress stating with specificity the exact statements he
seeks to suppress, and all legal claims therefore, as well as which items of physical
evidence he claims were improperly seized and the legal basis therefore. This Motion is
based on ICR 47 and the fact that defendant's vague reference to the suppression of
"statements" and "evidence" which should be suppressed "pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment" and "the Idaho Constitution" unduly prejudice the responding party.

1A~

,

DATED this-{;A- day of August 2013.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

'Zq{!i... day of August 2013, I caused to be

served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Discovery upon the
individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Gerald Bublitz
604 N. 16th St.
Boise, ID 83702
/

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.

o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __

OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES
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Telephone: (208) 344-5500
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN TlfE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICV\.L DISTIUCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THO);l!\S CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

)

CASE NO. CR-li'E-2013-5250

)
)
)

)
)
)

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

)
)

-------------)
X

**

COMES NOW the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his
attorney of record, Jessica B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C.
The purpose of this Supplemental Brief in Aid of Defendant's Motion to Suppress is
primarily to respond to the state's analysis of the wanantless search of the 1runk that occuned in
this case. The state is asserting that the automobile exception applies in this case, giving officers
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the trnnk itself. The state does not assert
that the dog aletied upon the trunk itself, or that there is probable cause to search the trunk in
particular. Rather, the probable cause appears to be based upon the observations of the officer
with regard to the defendant's reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors, along with the
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page I
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particular. Rather; the probable cause appears to be based upon the observations of the officer
with regard to the defendant's reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors, along with the
allegations that the drug dog hit upon the driver's side door, passenger's side door, (where there
was a bag of dog food) and rear passenger floorboards. The state's position is that any probable
cause to search a vehicle automatically extends to the entire vehicle, including the containers
therein. The defendant disputes that this is an accurate interpretation of current Idaho law on the
subject.
Probable cause to search the entirety of a vehicle does not automatically exist throughout
a vehicle simply because jt exits for a ce1iain part of e vehicle. The history of case law on the
subject is not as simple as the state asserts in its brief. Whether probable cause exists to search a
trunk of a vehicle is actually contingent upon what the probable cause leads the officer to belief
as far as the illegal activity, and the logical extension as to in particular where evidence of it may
be found. See 'fVilson v. State, 174 Md. App. 434, 921 A. 2d 881 (Md. App. 2007). As
explained in the case involving probable cause to search particular containers within an
automobile, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,824,102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.Ed. 2d 572
(1982), ''probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains
contraband or evidence does notjustffy a search ofihe entire cab." However, if the probable
cause extended. to the entirety of the vehicle, then the containers therein would be included in the
search. Id In a case where the state also argued that a drug dog hitting upon the passenger side of
a vehicle automatically gave the officer probable cause to search the entire vehicle, the court
stated, "[w]e think that overstates the matter. Because probable cause must be tailored to specific
compartments and containers within an automobile, the key is whether the dog "alerted" in the
precise vicinity of the trunk. That js a question of fact that the district court resolved in favor of
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF lN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2
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finding on the fact that first marijuana was found in the center console, which led to an additional
smell leading to the trunk itself.) See U.S. v. Carter, 300 F. 3d 415,422 (4111 Cir. 2002).
The law in Idaho is not as simplified nor as broad as the state asserts in its brief. "The
existence of probable cause to search the interior of a car is not necessarily sufficient to justii}' a
search of the car's trunk." State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P.3d 633 (2001). In that case,

the Idaho Supreme Court held that the smell of burnt marijuana was not sufficient to search the
trunk of a vehicle as well. See Id. The reason is because burnt marijuana only leads to probable
cause to believe use of drug activity may be present, not trafficking in drug activity (consistently
with a long line of other cases in other jurisdictions.) Id, at 1226. Since the smell ofraw

marijuana could indicate trafficking activity may be prese11t, the probable cause would extend to
the search of the entire vehicle.
The state relies upon State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 71 P. 3 d 1072, to support its
contention that probable cause to believe the vehicle contains narcotics automatically leads to
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the trwlk. It points to the fact that "as with
the present case, the trunk compartment was visible/partially visible to law enforcement outside
the cur." Efo'wcver, this fact of the courts analysis was only pertinent to the search incident to

aITest that the state relied upon in that case as a grorn1d for a lawful sem-ch. The visibility of the
item in the vehicle had to do with whether it was in fact a concealed weapon or not, thus
justifying the search incident to a lawful arrest. As the state notes, this was an issue the court
declined to address, and it has no factual analogy to U1e automobile exception asserted in this
matter. The com1 in that case did hold the search was lawful as part of the automobile exception
'
to the wainnt requirement, but not because any eviden·ce of narcotics ipso facto allows a search
of the emire vehicle. It had to do vvHh what the evidence had lead the officers to believe may be
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 3
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to the warrant requirement, but not because any evidence of narcotics ipso facto allows a search
of the entire vehicle. It had to do with what the evidence had lead the officers to believe may be
the illegal activity unden.vay, trafficking. It stated,« Veneroso's car vvas parked on a dark street
during the early moming hours in a residential area that was under construction. No other
persons or traffic were observed .... After approaching the vehicle, the officer observed a small
spoon lying on the backseat floorboard. From previous training experience, the officer
recognized the spoon as of the type commonly used by those involved in illegal drugs .
... Venernso's body language and statements led the officer to believe he was nervous and there
was something illegal in the vehicle .... Once inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle,
[they] discovered in the front seat area, two notebooks containing information ... officers
recognized as being associate(/ with dmg trafficking, including names, phone numbers, dolJar
amounts, and numbers indicating measurements of weight." See Id, emphasis added. This was
therefore analogous and in Jine with the cases that have held that probable cause to believe
trafficking is occuning, such as the smell ofraw marijuana, will provide a basis to search a trunk
as well, \Vhere trafficking materials are commonly located.

In this case, the officer did not have facts that would lead to a belief the defendant was

trafficking in marjjmma. He had some indicators that may be associated with drug use, such as
reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors. The drug dog did not alert on the trunk of the vehicJe,
only on the doors a floorboards of the passenger compartment. The state's assertion that any
probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle automatically leads to the trunk is overbroad
and mjsstates the law. The defendru1t has noted that the state asse11s it is in possession of
additional knowledge which has not been disclosed to date, wherein the Trooper was given
additional infonnation from an Oregon State Trooper \Vhich led him to believe the defendant was
SUPPLEMENTAL BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 4
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transporting narcotics. The defendant can only base this memorandum on the info1mation
provided in police repo1is so far.

DATED thisLf

'f'Y)ay of September, 2013.
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.

JE~Z
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify tha1 on this !,;/~ay of September, 2013, I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.

Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

D Hand Delivery
0U.S.Mai1
D Overnight Courier
[ZJ Facsimile Transmission

Ada County Clerk
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-6919

L~yR?b#~
Para~

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF TN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page S

000120
·---- -

-----------------------·- ·-------· ---

·--------------

Hansen, Miren, 09/11 /13, \.:JOSney

Time

Courtroom503

Speaker

Note

1:39:09 PM i
iState v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250
3: 15: 19 PM fstate Attorney
jJill Longhurst
3: 15:23 PM JDefense Attorney [Jessica Bublitz
:

:

3:15:28 PM fJudge Hansen

!calls case, def. is present on bond with counsel

-!: ~ ::!~-=~ -1~~~:n:! :~=~ney : : :~-:~-~:~: ~ -- -------- ----f
i
i
1

3:15:47 PM Judge Hansen

!cautions the parties - will limit the parties to the 5:00
hour may need to continue to a later date if not done

3:16:28 PM loefense Attorney
i
3: 17:02 PM fstate Attorney
3:17:30 PM loefense Attorney

lno opening remarks - did file an Affidavit shifting the
iburden to the State
lno opening remarks - couple of concerns
jcomments to the Court
·

. ;:~~:~~--=~--,~~:!\~:~~:~ --i: ~~o;,~;!t~;~;seI _________________________ _
:

:

1

3:20:35 PM lather/Witness
3:21 :36 PM ioefense Attorney
!
i
3:22:41 PM lstate Attorney
3:22:46 PM jJudge Hansen
i
:

.

joavid Szplett - is sworn
·
iwould have a motion in Limine that this witness does
!not have anything to add to the hearing today and my
i not be relevant
lresponse
jcomments - will not prohibit this witness from testifying
iand counsel may object during testimony
!

3:23:28 PM istate Attorney
idirect examination of Mr. Spzlett
3:25:09 PM ioefense Attorney iobjection

fresponse to the objection
3:25:22 PM fState Attorney
3:25:56 PM jJudge Hansen
jquestion to Ms. Bublitz
3:27:01 PM joefense Attorney jresponse to the Court
~

I

I

3:28: 12 PM 1Judge Hansen
overrules the objection
3:28:18 PM istate Attorney
icontinues with direct examination
3:29:29 PM fDefense Attorney !objection - leading
!I

i

:

................................................l...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

3:29:38 PM !Judge Hansen
jsustained
3:29:41 PM fstate Attorney
icontinues with direct examination
3:32:43 PM foefense Attorney !cross-examination of Mr. Spzlett

i

3:37:11 PM !State Attorney
3:37:23 ·PM jJudge Hansen
3:37:54 PM fstate Attorney

9/11/2013

i

Ire-direct examination
[witness stands down and is excused
[calls next Witness
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3:37:59 PM !,_Other/Witness
!Officer Blake Higley - is sworn and direct examined by
.
jMs. Longhurst
3:40:46 PM 1Defense Attorney [Objection - hearsay
i

i

3:41 :35 PM fJudge Hansen
[question to Ms. Bublitz
3:42:23 PM jDefense Attorney jresponse to the Court
:
:

3:44:03 PM tJudge Hansen
~

:
:

[comments to Counsel - question to Ms. Longhurst

i

····~::::!~··:~···l~::eAi;~:=~ -!;~::;:::~~~~·~o~~ ·Longhurst___ ---- ----3 :45: 50 PM jstate Attorney
jresponse to the Court
3:46:09 PM iDefense Attorney !will need additonal time

i

3:46: 17 PM fstate Attorney

~

I

does not think that the additional time is necessary

3:47:16 PM lDefense Attorney iresponse
3:48:42 PM lstate Attorney
fresponse
3:49:34 PM jJudge Hansen
jcomments to counsel
3:52:51 PM jDefense Attorney jresponse to the Court
i

i

3:53:07 PM tstate Attorney
3:55:03 PM iJudge Hansen
4:02:54 PM !Judge Hansen
!
4:07:53 PM 1Judge Hansen

[response
idiscussions with counsel on the Oregon stop
iwill have Officer Higley stand down today subject to
!recall
twill allow the designation of Officer Higley as the case
I
!officer and will allow him to remain in the Courtroom
!
!over the Defenses objection
4:09:50 PM lstate Attorney
icalls next witness
4:09:54 PM iother/Witness
iofficer Marshall Plaisted - is sworn and direct examined
!by Ms. Longhurst
4:21 :57 PM 1Defense Attorney [objection - leading

i

4:22:04 PM Ludge Hansen
4:22:09 PM istate Attorney
4:27:21 PM istate Attorney

!sustained
!continues with direct-examination
!would like the Video marked as State's 1 admitted and
published as to the dog search
.............................................................................................................t......................................................................................................................................................................................
4:33:06 PM !Judge Hansen
iwill allow that
4:33:10 PM !Defense Attorney !cross-examination of Officer Plaisted

i

i

;

I

i
i

I
i

4:39:15 PM !state Attorney
!objection - speculation
4:39:23 PM lJudge Hansen
[overruled
4:39:26 PM lDefense Attorney lcontinues with cross examination
I

I

I

I

:

:

. . .5:00:08
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .PM
. . . . . . . listate
. . . . . . . . . . Attorney
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !re-direct
!.....................................................................................................................................................................................
9/11/2013
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5:03:45 PM \Judge Hansen

\witness stands down and is excused

5:04: 16 PM iJudge Hansen
!

!

iwill need to recess for the day - will set the motion to
!suppress to 10/16/13 at 9:00 a.m. and will set for 2 day
!JT on 12/02/13 at 9 and PTC on 11/15/13 at 1:30 p.m.

~

~

f

IEND CASE

!

I

5:14:26 PM

•
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O~EP

12 2013

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA By MIREN OLSON
DEPUTY

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRFE13-5250

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL

A jury trial will be held on December 2, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
A pretrial conference will be held on November 15, 2013 at 1:30 pm. The defendant must
be personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a
written list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all
parties. If the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be
continued.
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a
list of potential alternate judges:
Hon. G.D. Carey
Hon. Dennis Goff
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr.
Hon. Duff McKee
Hon. Renae Hoff
Hon. W.H. Woodland
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen
Any sitting Fourth District Judge

Hon. James C. Morfitt
Hon. Gerald Schroeder
Hon. James Judd
Hon. Gregory Colet
Hon. Michael McLaughlin
Hon. Darla Williamson

IT IS SO ORDERED this /2-f....day of September, 2013.

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge
cc:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
604 NORTH 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL - PAGE -1
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Time

Speaker

Courtroom503

Note

09:06:01 AM!
!State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250
09:06:33 AM1 State
Jill Longhurst
!Attorney
09:06:39 AM1 Defense
Jessica Bublitz
!Attorney
09:06:47 AMf Judge
[ Calls case, def. is present on bond with counsel
1 Hansen
I
09:07:00 AMt Judge
t reviews file
Hansen
09:07:50 AM JState
would ask that the video of the stop be viewed in chambers
!Attorney
1
................................................+...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:08:41 AM! Defense
!would stipulate to that
I
!Attorney
...............................................+··············..·············· ..····"·i···············"··············································"··"······...............................................................................................................................
09:08:48 AM 1Judge
i will grant that stipulation
i
Hansen
!
................................................ J........................................i..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:08:57 AM! State
! calls first witness
·
!Attorney
09:09:04 AM{Other/Witn !Trooper Blake Higley
jess
!
09:09:42 AMl State
begins direct examination
!Attorney
!
09: 18:52 AM State
would like to admit Ex. 2 and 3 for illustrative only
!Attorney
09: 19: 13 AM f Defense
would object to the admission
!Attorney
!
09: 19:21 AM f Judge
[ would note the objection and overrrule it - will allow the
l
Hansen
!
admission for illustrative only
................................................ ,0......................................... 5, ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... .
09:20:20 AM! State
! continues with direct examination
!Attorney
09:22:32 AM f Defense
f objection foundation
i
!Attorney
................................................, ........................................f..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:22:39 AM 1State
i response to the objection
!Attorney
l
09:22:52 AMf Defense
response
I
!Attorney
................................................ ........................................ , ........................................................................................................................................................................................ '! .............. .
09:23:43 AM 1Judge
!will overrule the objection
Hansen
09:23:51 AMj State
continues with direct
!
!Attorney
................................................t........................................1..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:32:52 AM I Defense
!objection - leading
I
!Attorney
................................................ ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.
09:32:57 AM l Judge
!will sustain the objection
i Hansen I
................................................,1 ........................................ 1..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:33:01 AM! State
I continues with direct
I
!Attorney
.........................................................................................,..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:38: 17 AM! Defense
cross-examination of Trooper Higley
!Attorney I

I
i
l
I

I

!

I

I

!

1

l
I

I

I

!

~

!

!

I

,

I

10/16/2013
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09:42: 19 AM! State
! objects to the form of the question
!
(Attorney
09:42:30 AMf Judge
[ question to Ms. Longhurst
!Hansen !
09:42:45 AM! State
[ response to the Court
!Attorney
!
09:42:50 AMI Defense · [ response to the Objection
l,..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
!Attorney
.........................................................................................
09:43: 14 AM! Judge
Iwill overrule the objection
! Hansen
!
09:43:21 AMt Defense
f continues with cross-examination
!
!Attorney
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
09:57:07 AM IState
\ re-direct of Trooper Higley
(Attorney
!
09:57:42 AMf Defense
[ objection
l
(Attorney
09:57:47 AM{ State
response
l
!Attorney
09:57:57 AMI Judge
f question to Ms. Bublitz
Hansen
09:58:08 AM f Defense
response to the Court
l
!Attorney
09:58:13 AMI State
f no further comments
Attorney
09:58: 17 AM Judge
[ comments - will sustain the objection in part and overrule it in
!Hansen !part
09:58:44 AMI State
f continues with re-direct
!
!Attorney
................................................ ........................................ ;..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
10:04: 16 AM! Judge
!witness stands down and is excused
i
Hansen
!
................................................ i ........................................ i..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
10:04:35 AM! State
! no further evidence
!Attorney
10:04:41 AM Defense
f no evidence
Attorney
10:06:39 AM Judge
discussion on closing arguements
! Hansen
!
10:06:54 AM f Judge
will give Ms. Bublitz until 10/23 by 5 p.m. and the State will
!Hansen !have until 10/30 at 5:00 p.m. for final closing
10: 10: 19 AM Judge
f questions to the Def. on the waiver of speedy trial
I
Hansen
!
................................................ ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
10:13:51 AM I Defendant ! will waive speedy trial

I

!

!

i

i

i

i

·

,

I
i

l

i
i

I

·

I

i

,
i

I

I

I

,
I
................................................+I................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...

10:14:01 AM i Judge
i will accept the waiver
I
Hansen
................................................t...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
1O: 14:07 AM I Defense
!would like the def. to be able to waive presence at the Oral
I
Attorney
!
Aruguments
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
10:14:26 AM I State
I no objection
!Attorney

I

!

10/16/2013
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1O: 14:28 AM l Judge
IHansen
..1.0:15:06 AM!
i!

1comments

I

Courtroom503
to Mr. Kelley on his right to appear

END CASE

iI
:
:

i!
i

!
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IN THE DISTRICT COL'RT

F THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
I~ANDFORTHECOUNTYOFADA

*****
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
IBOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS

)
)
)
)

--------------1---)

*****

CO:MES NOW the Defenda , THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his

attorney ofrecord, Jessica B. Bublitz, of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C.
1. I.C §49-808(2) is Constitutio aJly void for vagueness on its face.

I.C §49-808(2) states, "Turning

vement.s and required signals. (1) No person shall turn a

vehicle onto a highway or move a ve ·cle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit
from a highway unless and until the ovement can be made with reasonable safety nor without
giving an appropriate signal. (2) A si al of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously to warn o er traffic. On controlled-access highways and before

Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page l
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tlll11ing from a parked position, the si nal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5)
seconds and, in all other instances, fo not less than the last one hundred ( I 00) feet traveled by
the vehicle before turning." As stated in the Defendant's memorandum in support of the motion
to suppress, this statute is void for va eness because it fails to clearly define it prohibitions by
( 1) confusing readers as to whether"

all other instances" a signal continuously for the last l 00

feet of travel is required, or both a si al for the last one hundred feet and for not less than 5
seconds is required. (2) It is unclear

to what is meant by a controlled access highway as

opposed to "all other instances." The expert from the DOT testified that he did not know the
difference between a controlled acce s highway and a through highway. In addition, he believed
the I-84 ,vould qualify as both. If the statute is read to mean that the signal is required for five
continuous seconds on a controlled a cess highway but for not less than the last 100 feet before
turning in "all other instances" (whi

would include a through highway) then it is unclear which

standard applies in the instant case. I an expert from the Department of Transportation does not
know the difference, then surely the tatute should not expect that ordinary people of common
intelligence wou1d.
The statute is also void as to 2) how long the signal is required and when exactly. The
officer who pulled over the defend t testified he believed the statute required the signal to take
place after the tires touched the mid e line and during the period of crossing over. Ifwe are to
assume the portion of the starute, w 'ch applies in this case, is that the signal shall be given
continuously for five seconds, the o y qualifier as to when it shall be given is the word
"continuously." Ifwe are to assume he portion is the 100 feet, then the qualifier is that it shall be
given for not less than the last 100

~

et "before turning." If the portion of the statute which

appl.ies is ''in all other instances", th n the signal should be given both "continuously" and "for

Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page 2
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the last 100 feet before turning."
Th~ statute is also void for vague ess as applied: (1) In this instance: what type of highway is
1-84? Without knowing for sure, eve if one were to say the statute is clear as to what is required,

if you aren't sure which category the ·ghway falls into, you cannot be sure which conduct
prohibited. In addition, (2) The offic

ts

testified that in his opinion, the claimant only signaled for

one or two seconds because he was o y counting the time when he was actually crossed over the
center lane~ which is not stated anyw ere in the statute.

2. The officer in this case did ot have justification or sufficient information that
. would give rise to reasonab e suspicion to extend the stop beyond the original
' purpose of the stop.

For case law and primary suppo , the counsel for the defendant defers to the Memorandum
in support of the motion to suppress led with the court. Of note, the state had suggested in its
reply that there was in fact addition information known to the officer that had been given to
him. via dispatch from Oregon State olice. In the First Addendum to Discovery filed by the state
on October 2, 2013, Officer Higley who did not testify at the suppression hearing) indicated
only that he had received informati

from the Oregon State Police that the defendant's vehicle

had been stopped and was "actings piciously," was making a "quick trip and had denied
consent" and that he therefore susp cted illegal activity. He did not have a drug dog, and had not
specific information which would ve rise to reasonable suspicion, however. While pretextual
stops are legally permissible (if the e is an actual legal basis for the stop), the stop cannot be
extended longer than the stated p

Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page
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The officer in this case stated he

lt be was justified in his extension of the stop because (I)

he had caught the defendant in a lie,

hen the defendant stated he had been already searched in

Oregon and (2) he noted that the defi dant had red eyes and "eyelid tremors." 'When on the
stand, the officer indicates that the w y he saw the eyelid tremors was by asking the defendant to
tilt his head back and close his eyes

he could observe him. Howe,ier~ according to the video,

he does not ask him to do this until h has already ex.tended the purpose of the stop, at six to
seven minutes into a lengthy convers tion about the defendant's travel plans. Therefore,
according to the standards articulate in State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002),
the extension that occurred was illeg I. The findings that an officer makes through investigation
into drug activity cannot also be use as the basis to extend the stop into an investigation into
drug activity. The officer asked him o step out of the car at 12:24, when clearly the purpose of
the stop had already been extended.
As to the allegation that he exten ed the stop because he had already caught the defendant
lying about the search, this conversa on does not take place on the video until after they are
already running the drug dog around he car, at minute 12:25. Therefore, the stop had already
been extended beyond the purpose o the stop at that point and cannot be a justification for the
extension of the stop. Therefore, the nly immediate, legitimate observation the officer could
possibly have made that made hims spicious of drug activity would have been red eyes, if they
were immediately observed. This in ombination with a travel story that the officer finds
"questionable" as unduly lengthy in oute and travel, even if legitimate, would fall in the
category of cases such as Reid v. Ge rgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct 2752 (1980).

Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page 4
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3. _There was no probable caus that would have justified a search of the trunk area.

The counsel for the defendant wo d defer to the legal standards as articulated in the

Supplemental brief in Support of the efendant's Motion to Suppress, which delineates why
there must be probable cause to searc the trunk before it can be searched. In this case, the
officer who actually searched the tru k did not have probable cause to do so. The officer who ran
the drug dog around the car did not r ceive an alert from the dog when he ran him around the
entirety of the vehicle, according to

s testimony on the stand. He alerted on the passenger side

of the vehicle, and the officer who ac ally conducted the search can be seen immediately
walking to the trunk to search it, wi

ut waiting to see if there was any kind of an alert from the

dog. The officer who conducted the

arch of the trunk area did not testify at the suppression

hearing, so his actual knowledge is n t in evidence. Therefore, there would be insufficient
evidence as to whether he possessed robable cause to search the trunk itself prior to his search,
and no exception to the warrant req

ment applies. As a result, the evidence found in the trunk

must be suppressed.

DATED

thi,23V:y ofOct

er 2013.

Attorney for Defendant
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CER ~CATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

~fay

of October 2013, I caused a true and accurate copy

of the foregoing document to be serv d upon the following as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise> Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

0

Hand Delivery
0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
~ Facsimile Transmission

Ada County Clerk

200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-6919
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jill Longhurst
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant,

______________

)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250

)
)
)
)

STAT~'S WRITTEN CLOSING
STATEMENTS REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

)
)
)
)

Defendant Kelley has moved this court for an order suppressing evidence against
the defendant for three reasons.
Kelley claims that LC. §49-808 is unconstitutionally vague.
Kelley claims that he was detained longer than the original purpose of the stop
without reasonable suspicion.
Kelley claims that there was "no justification" for the search of the trunk area of
his vehicle.
The State believes that the defendant's claims are all incorrect and his motion to
suppress should be denied.
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 1 of 19
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I. I.C.§49-808 is not vague.
J.C. §49-808 is not vague. In order to prevail on a claim that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague, a defendant must show either the statute is vague on its face or
vague on its application. Defendant Kelley has done neither.
To be void on its face, Kelley would have to have demonstrated that the statute
would lack sufficient clarity for "ordinary people" to understand what "conduct is
prohibited." Burton v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 149 Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d 933, 935
(Ct.App.2010) (citation omitted). To the contrary, I.C. §49-808(2) delineates both when
a driver is required to signal an impending change in his vehicle's position and the
appropriate method, by either distance or time, to perform and signal depending on the
nature of the roadway. The statute requires drivers on a controlled access highway, such
as an interstate highway, shall signal their intention to move their vehicles to the left or
right for not less than five seconds.
The statute is not vague on its face. The Idaho Court of Appeals has specifically
held that as to the requirement to signal, this statute is not vague stating that there are "no
exceptions to the signal requirement" and that a signal is required "whenever a movement
is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is made
necessary to comply with highway signage." State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666, 991
P.2d 388, 391 (Ct.App.1999)( citing State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277,279, 954 P.2d
1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998)). Clearly motorists like Kelley are on notice that a signal is
required prior to changing lanes. There is no vagueness on the face of this statute.

STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 2 of 19
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Similarly, Kelley has failed to show that this statute was vague as to the
application to his driving. Kelley's claim is that because of vagueness in the statute the
signal requirements were unclear as to how the statute applied to him. Kelley bases this
claim, primarily, on his assertion that he was unclear by statutory definition as to
whether I-84 is a controlled access highway and therefore, he was unclear as to whether
he 'Yas required to signal for 100 feet or for five seconds due to what he alleges is
"confusing" comma placement in the statute.
Interstate 84 is the definition of a controlled access highway. I.C. §49-109(5)(b).
A review of the officer's dash cam, which was admitted into evidence during the
suppression hearing, clearly demonstrates that there are no accesses to the interstate from
abutting lands. This testimony was supported by the officers' testimony and specifically
by the testimony of David Szplett from the Idaho Transportation Department. Abutting
landowners are not given access to the interstate. Access and egress are controlled by
ramps. Moreover, Mr. Szplett testified that I-84 is a controlled access highway as
designated by the Idaho Board of Transportation. I.C. §40-310(9) grants the Board
authority to make the designations of highways as controlled access and the Board has
declared I-84 as a controlled access highway. There is no confusion as to whether I-84 is
a controlled access highway.
Moreover, there is no confusion as to comma placement in I.C. §49-808 and what
type of a signal is required for drivers on a controlled access highway. "The plain,
obvious and rational [statutory] meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or
irrational meaning." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40,966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998).
Interpretation of statutes requires interpretations which give "effect to the legislature's
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 3 of 19
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intent and purpose." Dewbre, Idaho at 665; P.2d at 390 (quoting State v. Coleman, 128
Idaho 466,469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App.1996)). A review of this statute for its meaning
clearly indicates that drivers on a controlled access highway are required to signal for five
seconds.
Likewise, a reasonable common sense read of this statute indicates the
legislatures' intent to promote safety on our highways by requiring a driver to give other
motorists advanced notice of their lane changes. Not only is the language of the statute
clear, it is irrational to argue that on a roadway where motorists can legally travel 75
m.p.h. the legislature meant to require drivers to give notice to other motorists for only a
fraction of a second while covering only 100 feet of roadway at high speeds rather than
the longer, safer notices, of five seconds.
Finally, there is no vagueness as to the application of this statute to the defendant
because the factual situation and the statute's plain language are in accord. This statute
clearly has a rational and expected application to drivers who changes lanes on multilaned interstate highways as was the case here. This is not a situation where it may be
unclear whether a particular road way is a controlled access roadway because of its
commercial nature, such as roadways like Chinden Boulevard in Ada County like in

Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,235,207 P.3d 963, 966 (2009)(noting the
Chinden Boulevard is a controlled-access highway), or a situation where citizens are
trying to determine whether roadways where one lane ends and one lane continues
require a signal like in Burton v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 149 Idaho 746,240 P.3d 933,
(Ct.App.2010) or whether a signal is required when motorists are required to move lanes
due to highway signs, State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663,666, 991 P.2d 388,391
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 4 of 19
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(Ct.App.1999). In the instant case, it is clear that the interstate is a controlled access
'

highway and it is clear that moving from one lane to another requires a signal. These are
not facts subject to multiple interpretations.
As demonstrated by Trooper Higley's dash cam, which was admitted into
evidence during the hearing, Defendant Kelley's vehicle first signaled a lane change at
00: 18:24. The signal lasted for only two seconds before the defendant's vehicle right
passenger tires had both entered into the right hand lane at 00:18:26. Kelley's signal
prior to moving his vehicle into another lane was for two seconds or less which is an
appropriate basis for a traffic stop.
Accordingly, Defendant Kelley had failed to demonstrate that I.C.§49-808 is
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as it is applied to the facts of this traffic infraction.
The State asks the Court to deny the defendant's motion to suppress on this ground.

II.

Reasonable Suspicion and the Length of the Traffic Stop

· Kelley presumably believes that any drug dog sniff at a traffic stop or any
questions not directly related to a traffic infraction during law enforcement/citizen
contacts are presumptively an illegal detention. That is not the case. "The U.S. Supreme
Court has also recently held that a drug dog sniff is not a search and therefore may be
done during a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of drug activity. It is therefore
not necessarily a Fourth Amendment violation for an officer who has stopped someone
for a traffic stop to ask unrelated questions about drugs and weapons, or to run a drug dog
around the perimeter of the vehicle." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563, 112 P.3d 848,
851 (Ct.App.2005)(citations omitted).

STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 5 of 19
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Although the investigative detention necessarily should be "related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the stop," the scope of the detention may be expanded based
on events occurring during the scope of the stop. State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59,266
P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct.App. 2011). Accordingly, during the course of an investigative
detention, "[i]f a police officer's suspicions are 'confirmed or further aroused, the stop
may be prolonged and the scope of the investigative stop enlarged."' State v. Wright, 134
Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 877, 736
P .2d 1327, 1331 (1987)). The totality of the circumstances relayed to, observed by and
inferred by Trooper Higley during the brief course of this traffic infraction gave him
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to investigate further.
Moreover, Trooper Higley had not yet finished the purpose of the traffic stop by the time
the drug dog positively alerted to the odor of narcotics at the defendant's vehicle thereby
giving him probable cause to search the car.
Trooper Higley observed, and captured on his dash cam, a violation ofldaho's
traffic laws, specifically, LC. 49-808. "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may
stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior ifthere is articulable and
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." State v.

Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct.App. 2000)(citations omitted).
Trooper Higley's stop of the defendant's vehicle was clearly proper and based on
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws.
From the time the defendant's vehicle yielded to the trooper's lights and came to a
complete stop and the time Trooper Higley approached the vehicle and began
investigating the traffic infraction, only about 30 seconds had passed. 00:19:00 to
STATE' S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 6 of 19
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00: 19:32. When Trooper Higley approached the defendant's vehicle from the passenger
side, he immediately noticed a dog in the car and at that point he verified with Kelley that
the dog was friendly and not a threat. Higley then identified himself as a law
enforcement officer and explained to the defendant the reason for the stop. It took Higley
just over 30 seconds to ask these questions and to ask the defendant for his license,
registration and proof of insurance. 00:20:06. When he looked at the license and
registration, Higley merely commented "New Hampshire license and California plate.
00:20:18
Defendant Kelley was nervous and talkative with the trooper and after the
trooper's statement immediately began volunteering information to the trooper about a
traffic stop in Oregon. The topic was introduced by the defendant; it was out of context
to the comment about the license. The defendant's statements were contrary to
information the trooper knew about the Oregon stop.
Kelley then began describing details of a trip from Lake Tahoe California, to
Jackson Hole Wyoming which included traveling through Oregon and the Boise area.
Trooper Higley knew that the route described by Kelley was not a route to Jackson Hole
and would have added many hours to the trip. Kelley had already commented that he
hadn't had problems with snow on the roadways and he never offered that as an
explanation for his circuitous route to Jackson Hole.
By 00:22:32, Higley's supervisor had already approached the traffic stop and
notified him that there was a drug dog on scene. By that time, Higley had already asked
for proof of insurance from Kelley again. Kelley explained why he did not have the
required insurance. 00:22:50 Kelley's failure to provide motor vehicle insurance when
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asked by a peace officer was a further violation ofldaho's motor vehicle laws. LC. §491232. See also, §49-1229.
During the two and a half minutes that Trooper Higley had been talking to the
defendant he had noticed rolling papers in the vehicle and indications from defendant
Kelley that Kelley had been using a controlled substance - specifically red eyes and
eyelid tremors. After making this observation, Higley asked Kelley to tilt his head and
close his eyes so he could further ascertain whether there was a concern about Kelley
being impaired. 00:23:04. Higley's observations of Kelley, his eyelid tremors and red
eyes as well as his nervous manner, lead Higley to believe Kelley had used marijuana in
the recent past. In the brief conversation that followed, Higley asked the defendant when
the last time he used marijuana was. Initially Kelley denied using marijuana ever and
then changed his statement to say that he had used marijuana in the past, but not for two
years. This statement was not consistent with Higley's observations.
Kelley then provided the trooper more information regarding his trip and how
long he was planning to be in Jackson Hole and why. Trooper Higley knows that the I-84
corridor between Oregon and through Idaho is a route frequently used to transport
narcotics. He also knew that individuals who distribute or traffic in narcotics frequently
make short fast trips between locations. Higley also knows that because marijuana is not
illegal to "medical card" holders in Oregon, this controlled substance is frequently
purchased in Oregon and transported through surroundings states such as Idaho.
Higley is familiar with indications of controlled substances use and possible
impairment and he is aware that use of marijuana can lead to eyelid tremors. At 00:24:25
Trooper Higley asked the defendant to secure his dog and to step from the vehicle in
STATE' S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 8 of 19

000141

order to allow Officer Plaisted's already present narcotics detection dog to sniff the
vehicle. Higley' s conversation with Kelley had been brief and directed to the traffic
infraction, the lack of insurance, identification and clarifying the defendant's statements
regarding the nature of the trip, the vehicle's owner and related matters. At the time that
Higley asked Kelley to step from the vehicle, just less than five minutes had passed since
Higley had first approached Kelley and began speaking to him.
At that point, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to believe that Kelley was
involved in criminal activity. Kelley had demonstrated physical characteristics consistent
with fairly recent marijuana use, though Kelley had lied to the Trooper and told him that
he had never used and then that he had not used in two years. Kelley had volunteered
that he had been stopped in Oregon by law enforcement there, and described facts
different than those which Higley knew had occurred.
Higley had observed the partially visible trunk from outside the vehicle and knew
that the defendant had very few possessions/luggage with him on this trip. Kelley had
described a circuitous trip plan which significantly added time to the short trip and was
consistent travel plans of known marijuana and narcotics dealers. Similarly, Trooper
Higley had information from Oregon law enforcement regarding this specific vehicle,
identified by make, color and license number being involved in suspicious activity.
"Articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion, while usually grounded in an
officer's personal perceptions and inferences may, in appropriate circumstances, be based
on external information. Whether an officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to
detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances - the
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collective knowledge of all those officers and dispatchers involved." State v. Baxter, 144
Idaho 672, 677-78, 268 P.3d 1019, 1024-25 (Ct.App.2007)(citations omitted).
Higley's initial detention was directly related to the observed traffic infraction.
Although the investigative detention necessarily should be "related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the stop," the scope of the detention may be expanded based
on events occurring during the scope of the stop. State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59, 266
P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct.App. 2011). Accordingly, during the course of an investigative
detention, "[i]f a police officer's suspicions are 'confirmed or further aroused, the stop
may be prolonged and the scope of the investigative stop enlarged."' State v. Wright, 134
Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292,295 (2000) (quoting State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 877, 736
P.2d 1327, 1331 (1987)). The defendant's nervous behaviors, prior use of marijuana and
deceit about his use, his circuitous route through Oregon and along known drug
distribution routes and his failure to produce insurance aroused further suspicion which
justified an extension of the stop to further investigate.

It took Kelley an additional one to one and a half minutes to leash and safely
remove his dog from his vehicle in order for the narcotics detection dog to approach his
vehicle. During that time, Kelley made further statements to Trooper Higley about the
Oregon law enforcement traffic stop which were significantly suspicious and was not
consistent with what Higley's knowledge of the events were or his own observations
about the contents of his vehicle. Kelley claimed that Oregon had a drug dog with them
and had emptied his vehicle and it took him more than an hour to repack all of his
personal items. Higley knew that the Oregon law enforcement did not have a drug dog
available and had released him from the stop without a search. He also observed very
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few personal items in the vehicle and trunk area and knew that the defendant's timeline
and explanations of the length of his detention in Oregon were false. During that time,
Kelley acknowledged that he had beer cans in the back seat of the car - though he denied
drinking that night- causing further suspicion of criminal activity.
Officer Plaisted and his narcotics detection dog initially approached Kelley's
vehicle around 00:25:49. Within 27 seconds of his initial approach to Kelley's vehicle,
Officer Plaisted's narcotic detection dog gave a positive alert to the odor of narcotics and
sat at the driver's side door. 00:26: 12 At the point the narcotics detection dog alerted,
officers had probable cause to believe there were narcotics substances in the defendant's
vehicle. When Officer Plaisted's dog gave the first affirmative alert to the odor or
narcotics at the driver's side door, less than seven minutes had elapsed from Trooper
}.ligley's first comments/statements to the defendant when he approached the passenger
door of Kelley's vehicle.
Defendant Kelley claims that this seven minute time frame was unreasonable and
that the defendant was unlawfully detained because the traffic stop had been
unreasonably extended. Even without the trooper's observations regarding the
defendant's eyelid tremors and red eyes, the defendant's volunteered and contrary
statements about his Oregon law enforcement contact and his convoluted explanation for
his circuitous route from Lake Tahoe to Jackson Hole via Oregon and Boise, Idaho, it is
implausible to believe that any Idaho law enforcement officer would have been able to
verify the status of a New Hampshire driver's license, a California vehicle registration,
and write and serve traffic infractions for the moving violation and the lack of insurance
proof in the four minutes that passed between the time the defendant affirmatively
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confirmed he did not have proof of vehicle insurance (00:22:50) and the positive alert of
the narcotics detention dog (00:26:12). It is hard to imagine a legitimate complaint that
any traffic stop which lasted seven minutes where moving and non-moving violations
were involved was unreasonably long. The defendant makes the complaint here because
this traffic infraction led to the discovery of a trafficking amount of controlled substances
based on the narcotics detection dog's alert seven minutes after Trooper Higley first
spoke to the defendant. It is relevant to note, that while the dog sniff was occurring,
Trooper Higley was still obtaining identifying information from the defendant including
trying to verify his "current address." 00:26:34-55. It is necessary to know the driver's
current address in order to issue a citation in Idaho.
Trooper Higley is entitled to rely on all the information he and other law
enforcement officers knew and reasonable inferences therefrom at the time of his contact
with the defendant. If during the course of his routine traffic investigation he acquired
additional information which gave him reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
extend the detention to investigate. That is exactly what happened in this instance. The
defendant volunteered almost immediately information which was suspicious and which
the officer knew to be false. Trooper Higley knew that the defendant's mode of travel
and unusual circuitous route was consistent with narcotics trafficking. He was nervous,
had red eyes and eyelid tremors and his story about Oregon law enforcement contact was
false. The defendant was unable to produce insurance proof and had a changing story
about ownership of the vehicle and when anyone else had last driven it. As manifest by
his statements on the audio, he was not the registered owner, but he at different times
claimed what seems to be exclusive possession of the vehicle which was registered in
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California while he claim to be a New Hampshire resident. All of the information known
to Higley at the time, including the information from Oregon law enforcement and the
defendant's changing story was more than sufficient to give Higley a reasonable
suspicion that there was criminal activity and to extend the stop long enough to make
investigate. Indeed, even while the drug dog sniff was occurring, Kelley continued to
volunteer statements which were more suspicions such as indicating there had been a
I

drug dog sniff by Oregon officers and talk about a very extended search and lengthy time
to repac~ what was obviously minimal personal belongings.
At the time of the drug dog sniff, Higley had not yet completed the purpose of his
stop nor issued citations for moving violations and the non-moving violation nor had he
verified the validity of the defendant's out-of-state driver's license. Moreover, he had
r.easonable articulable suspicion of further criminal activity based on information
provided by the defendant and false statements made by the defendant as well as
observations consistent with fairly recent marijuana use. Higley's detention of the
defendant was not unlawful and he was not unlawfully detained.

III.

Search of the Trunk

Kelley argues that officers illegally searched the trunk of his vehicle. In his
closing statement, Kelley indicates that because the officer who searched the trunk did
not testify, this court is unable to ascertain his "actual" knowledge. This is an incorrect
assumption as it is contrary to case law. Officers in the field can and do rely on
information known to other officers routinely. It is error to assume that each individual
officer must have independent information amounting to probable cause before they may
act. "An officer in the field may rely on information supplied by other officers and the
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collective knowledge of police officers involved in the investigation - including dispatch
personnel - may support a finding of probable cause." State v. Carr, 123 Idaho 127, 130,
844 P .2d 13 77, 13 80 (Ct.App.1992)(citations omitted).
In this case, the dog handler clearly testified that the dog alerted to the odor of
narcotics from the vehicle more than once before he placed the dog inside the vehicle.
These alerts are plainly visible and easily verified from a review of the dash cam video.
00:26: 12 and 00:26:43. Moreover, once the handler identified positive alerts to the odor
of controlled substances from the vehicle, he placed the dog inside the car. The dog
again was very focused on an area at the base of the back seat. 00:27:30 - 00:29:06. The
dog continued to focus his attention there and tried to get closer and the officer removed
items from the rear seat floor to allow the dog to continue his search. The dog continued
to alert and focus on that particular area. 00:29:50. The dog's alert to this area was a
clear indication that he detected the odor of controlled substances from the trunk area
even after items were removed. The trunk area is directly behind the area of the interior
alert. It is clear that the dog's handler believed that the dog was alerting to the trunk area.
Similarly, Trooper Higley testified that based on his training and experience, he knows
that the dog handler would not put the dog in the vehicle unless there has been a positive
alert.
This uniform knowledge by Higley and law enforcement is evidenced by the
audio recorded conversation between the defendant and Trooper Higley when the dog
entered the vehicle. At 00:27:46, Kelley asked Higley ifhe could tell him why "he was
in my car." Higley replied that if the dog was in the interior of the car it means that the
dog alerted "to the exterior of the vehicle to the odor of drugs" and they had "probable
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cause to search your vehicle." Higley's supervisor was standing with them at the time of
this conversation. Certainly, the odor detection dog's focus and alert to the rear seat area,
including his tail wag is plainly manifest even to an untrained eye from the dash cam
video. Higley's supervisor did not begin to search the trunk area until about two minutes
of the dog's continued focus on the rear seat had occurred. 00:29:04 Certainly at the
point Officer Plaisted knew there was probable cause to search the trunk area. Whether
or not that information was communicated verbally or by observation of officers familiar
with the narcotic dog process is irrelevant. The collective knowledge of law enforcement
at the point the dog alerted to the backseat floor area was that there was probable cause to
believe there were controlled substances in the trunk.
Moreover, Kelley's argument is in error because he assumes that when a narcotics
detection dog alerts to the odor of narcotics it must be to the trunk area or the "alert" is
limited to the passenger compartment only. There is no case law nor was any evidence
presented at hearing which supports this position. Narcotics detection dogs alert to the .
odor of narcotics. In this case, the plain testimony is that before ever entering the
vehicle, the narcotics detection dog clearly alerted more than once to the odor of
narcotics from the vehicle. The reliability of the dog was not at issue in this hearing.
Indeed, the dog's alerts were clearly correct as officers found a trafficking amount of
controlled substances in the vehicle. Kelley's assumption that the alert must be to the
trunk area from the outside of the vehicle is clearly an unsubstantiated position not
supported by case law.
The dog handler clearly testified that the dog alerted to the odor of narcotics from
the vehicle more than once before he placed the dog inside the vehicle. These alerts are
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plainly visible and easily verified from a review of the dash cam video. 00:26:12 and
00:26:43. Moreover, once the handler identified positive alerts to the odor of controlled
substances from the vehicle, he placed the dog inside the car. The vehicle's windows
were down. As Officer Plaisted and his dog approached the defendant's vehicle to begin
the search, the dog clearly lifts his head and begins to sniff toward the driver's window as
they walk past the open driver's side window. 00:25:50. Once the vehicle sniff began,
the dog can be seen to clearly sniff intently at the open window area at the driver's door
and then immediately sit and give a positive alert, 00:26:07. And then, again, the dog
clearly sniffed and focused at the open passenger window first and then immediately
gave his second positive alert to the odor or narcotics from the exterior of the vehicle.
00:26:38.
The testimony of Trooper Higley is that the rear seat of the vehicle was down and
open to the trunk area allowing him to see into part of the trunk from outside the vehicle.
Certainly the odor of anything in the trunk would have been inside the vehicle interior. It
seems that Kelley's argument is that the dog must alert to the exterior of the trunk area
before officers could search the trunk. It is irrational to assume that the odor of drugs
would be stronger at the closed trunk area than it is from the open windows of the
passenger compartment when the trunk area is open to the passenger compartment. A
clear review of the dash cam video demonstrates a dog that very clearly identified the
odor of narcotics from the two open windows where the odor would be stronger:.... and
then became immediately focused once in the rear seat/floor board interior of the vehicle
once he was in the car. It isn't an accident that the controlled substances were found in
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the trunk and the dog remained focused and alerting to an area identifying the trunk for a
lengthy time once in the car since that is exactly where the drugs were located.
"The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature
of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found."
State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,210,226 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct.App.2011) citing United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.24 572 (1982). Furthermore, the
search of a trunk area is lawful "[u]nder the automobile exception, police officers may
search an automobile and the containers within it where they have cause to believe that
the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho
925, 939, 71 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Ct.App.2003)(citations omitted).
Law enforcement officers at the scene had probable cause to believe that Kelley's
trunk contained controlled substances. The search of the trunk was lawful and falls
squarely within the recognized automobile exception.
VII.

CONCLUSION

LC. § 49-808 is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or in its application. The
trooper's stop of Kelley for failing to properly signal was proper.
Based on a totality of the circumstances, information known to Trooper Higley
and other officers as well as Higley' s training and experiences with narcotics intervention
and reasonable inferences therefrom, Higley had reasonable articulable suspicion to
extend the length of Kelley's detention and traffic stop to investigate further criminal
activity. The length of Kelley's detention relating to this traffic stop was reasonable and
there was no constitutional violation.
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Officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant has controlled
substances in his vehicle - including in his trunk and the search of the defendant's
vehicle including the trunk and containers therein for controlled substances was proper
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Accordingly, the State respectfully asks the court the deny the defendant's motion
to suppress.

GREG H. BOWER/.
Ada County Prosec mg Attorney
i

secuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

71),e

day of October 2013, I caused

to be served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Discovery upon
the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Gerald/Jessica Bublitz
604 N. 16th St.
Boise, ID 83702

)t

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
first class.

o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available
for pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
)( By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:

3~3~ lolD~
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Hansen, Miren, 11/06/13, Gosney

Time

Speaker

Courtroom501

Note

3:36:33 PM l

!State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250

4:04:25 PM iJudge Hansen
l

icalls case, def. is not present - Ms. Bublitz is here on his
lbehalf - both sides submitted written closings - will note that
lat the last hearing Mr. Kelley waived his right to be present

~

l

-::~::~:-:~i~:=n~::::;ney -!~!s~~:g:~~;tz--- ---- ------- ------ l

................................................,i.....................................................................~ ......................................................................................................................................................................................................

4:05:38 PM \Defense Attorney
4:05:49 PM fJudge Hansen

l

I

\would intend to proceed without the defendant
ihas reviewed both closing statments - in making closing
\arguements would ask the parties to not restate what is in
\the written statements

_::~::~~· =~·· i~=~n;: ,~:~ney_-i::~:~::go:::;:~t- ______ ___ _______
4: 13:08 PM lDefense Attorney
4: 19:06 PM \Judge Hansen

jfinal comments
\will take the matter under advisement and issue a written
l
\decision - will note that there is a waiver of speedy trial 1
1PTC is scheduled for 11 /15 at 1:30
4:20: 18 PM istate Attorney
twould ask to be able to release witnesses for the 12/02 trial
1
!date
4:20:35 PM tDefense Attorney tno objection to that
·
· 4:20:38 PM iJudge Hansen
iwill vacate the December 2 trial date and will keep the PTC
!
!as a status or review hearing
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
4:20:55 PM I
\END CASE

I
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Hansen, Miren, 11/15/1;:s, Bohr (a.m.), Medrano (p.m.)
Time
1:34:20 PM
1:34:33 PM
1:34:38 PM
1:34:44 PM
1:34:54 PM

Speaker

Courtroom507
Note

\
jstate Attorney
f Defense Attorney
jJudge Hansen
JJudge Hansen

[Jill Longhurst
)essica Bublitz
jcalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel
jreviews file- notes the previous waiver of speedy trial

:

:

\State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250

1:35:33 PM fJudge Hansen
1:37:44 PM fJudge Hansen

fcomments to the Court

1:39:21 PM •

[END CASE

I

\will set for a 2 day JT on 03/17/14 at 9 and PTC on
j03/05/14 at 3:00 p.m.

I
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NOV 18 2013
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST&IfRTSYOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MIREN OLSON

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEPUTY

Case No. CRFE13-5250

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL

A jury trial will be held on March 17, 2014 at 9:00 a.m.
A pretrial conference will be held on March 5, 2014 at 3:00 pm. The defendant must be
personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a written
list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all parties. If
the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be continued.
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a
list of potential alternate judges:
Hon. G.D. Carey
Hon. Dennis Goff
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr.
Hon. Duff McKee
Hon. Renae Hoff
Hon. W.H. Woodland
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen
Any sitting Fourth District Judge

Hon. James C. Morfitt
Hon. Gerald Schroeder
Hon. James Judd
Hon. Gregory Culet
Hon. Michael McLaughlin
Hon. Darla Williamson

IT IS SO ORDERED this ..£-day of November, 2013.

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge
cc:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
604 N 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE coUNfi: OF ADA!;'.'~,(~

2

DEC 18 2013

3

4

15'

THE STA TE OF IDAHO,

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KARI MAXWELL

6

D!PUTY

Plaintiff,

5

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

7

8
9

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant.

10
11

BACKGROUND

12

Defendant Thomas Kelley is charged with the felony offense of Trafficking in Marijuana.

13

On April 19, 2013, at approximately 12:20 a.m., Idaho State Police Trooper Blake Higley initiated a

14

traffic stop of a green Honda Civic on Interstate 84 in Ada County, Idaho, for failure to signal a lane
change for a minimum of five seconds as required under I.C. § 49-808(2). Prior to the stop, the

15

Idaho State Police received information from the Oregon State Police that the vehicle had been

16

stopped in Oregon earlier that night. The information from the Oregon State Police indicated that

17

the encounter had aroused suspicion, but as no K-9 unit was available and the driver did not consent

18

to a search of the vehicle, the driver was allowed to continue on his way. This information from the

19

Oregon State Police had been communicated to Trooper Higley and other Idaho State Police
officers. When Trooper Higley stopped the vehicle, the driver, Defendant Thomas Kelley, produced

20

a New Hampshire driver's license.

Defendant indicated the vehicle belonged to a friend and

21

produced registration that showed the vehicle was registered in California. Defendant was unable to

22

provide proof of insurance.

23

backpacks, a pair of skis, and some dog items. The passenger side of the back seat had been folded

24

Trooper Higley observed a dog in the vehicle, as well as a few

down to accommodate the skis, and Trooper Higley could see into part of the trunk area.
Defendant indicated he was coming from the Tahoe area and heading to Jackson Hole. He

25

said he planned to stay in Jackson Hole for a short time, return to the Tahoe area, and then leave

26
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Tahoe again to drive to New Hampshire for his summer job.

Shortly into the conversation,

1

Defendant volunteered that he had been stopped in Oregon earlier that night and that he had been
2

"searched." Defendant indicated that the search took over two hours total, that it took thirty minutes

3

for the K-9 unit to arrive, and that it took an hour for Defendant to put everything back into his

4

vehicle after the search.

5

During the conversation, Trooper Higley observed that Defendant had reddened conjunctiva
and exhibited eyelid tremors. Trooper Higley observed some Zig Zag rolling papers in the vehicle,

6

which Defendant stated he used for rolling tobacco. Trooper Higley also observed rolling tobacco in
7

the vehicle. When asked when he had last used marijuana, Defendant indicated that he did not

8

smoke marijuana but that he had used marijuana about two years previously, while he was in

9

college. Trooper Higley was concerned that there were narcotics in the vehicle. Trooper Higley

10

asked for consent to search the vehicle, which Defendant declined.

While Trooper Higley was

speaking to Defendant about the details of his trip and the stop in Oregon, Officer Marshall Plaisted
11

of the Boise City Police Department arrived on the scene with his drug detection K-9, Turk.
12

Sergeant Jason Cagle, Trooper Higley's supervisor, had also arrived on the scene to assist. Trooper

13

Higley had Defendant exit the vehicle along with his dog. While Officer Plaisted was deploying his

14

drug detection K-9 around the vehicle, Defendant continued to talk to Trooper Higley about the

15

search of his vehicle in Oregon earlier that night, reiterating how long the search took and other
details of the search.

16

Officer Plaisted presented the exterior of Defendant's vehicle to his K-9 in a
17

counterclockwise manner. The K-9 alerted at the driver's side door, where the window had been

18

rolled down. Officer Plaisted continued to present the exterior of the vehicle, and the K-9 alerted at

19

the passenger's side door, where the window had also been rolled down. Officer Plaisted then

20

placed the K-9 inside the vehicle from the driver's side door. The K-9 immediately jumped into the
back seat, where there was a large bag of dog food. The K-9 attempted to sniff around the bag and

21

put his nose underneath it, so Officer Plaisted removed the bag of dog food from the vehicle. The K22

9 continued to alert in that area, attempting to put his nose in between the seat back crevice and also

23

around the seat cushion at the floor board area in the rear of the vehicle.

24
25

After the K-9 was placed inside the vehicle, Trooper Higley and Sergeant Cagle began to
search the vehicle. Sergeant Cagle focused his search on the trunk area of the vehicle. Three
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 2

000157

vacuum-sealed containers of marijuana were found in the vehicle, two of which were located in the
1

trunk area. The third was packaged separately in a Tupperware container.
2

On July 18, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing, along with a

3

supporting memorandum.

4

Suppress was filed on July 26, 2013. The State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

5

Motion to Suppress was filed on August 16, 2013. On August 30, 2013, the State filed an Objection

An Affidavit of Thomas Campbell Kelley in Support of Motion to

to the Form of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Limit Defendant's Motion to
6

Suppress to Issues Identified by the Defendant in his Motion/Brief.
7
8
9

10

A Supplemental Brief in

Support of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress was filed on September 4, 2013.
Hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress was held on September 9 and October 16, 2013.
Defendant's Closing Arguments were filed on October 23, 2013.

The State's Written Closing

Statements Regarding Defendant's Motion to Suppress were filed on October 30, 2013. The parties
presented oral closing arguments on November 6, 2013, at which time the Court took the matter

11

under advisement.
12

13
14
15

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the State had filed an objection to the form of
Defendant's motion to suppress, asserting that the bases for the motion had not been clearly defined.
At the hearing, Defendant clarified that the motion involves three issues: 1) whether LC. § 49-

16

808(2) is void for vagueness; 2) whether Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to extend the
17

duration of the traffic stop; and 3) whether there was probable cause to search the trunk of the

18

vehicle. · With the understanding that the motion was limited to these three issues, the parties then

19

proceeded with the presentation of evidence.

20

21

Idaho Code section 49-808(2) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to Defendant's
conduct.

22

The "void-for-vagueness doctrine," which is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the

23

Fourteenth Amendment, "requires that a statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil

24

sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand

25

what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary
and discriminatory· enforcement." Burton v. State, Dep't. ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d

26
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933, 935 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a statute may be "void for vagueness if it
1

fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes,
2

or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce

3

the statute." State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 576, 578, 249 P.3d 375, 377 (2011), quoting State v.

4

Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003).

5

A statute may be challenged as

unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct. Burton, 149 Idaho at
748, 240 P.3d at 935 (citation omitted). To succeed on a facial vagueness challenge, a defendant

6

must show that the statute is "impermissibly vague in all its applications." State v. Doe, 148 Idaho
7

919, 931, 231 P.2d 1016, 1028 (2010), quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

8

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 371 (1982). To succeed on

9

an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a defendant "must show that the statute failed to provide fair

10

notice that the [defendant's] specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the

11

[defendant]." Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 P.3d at 935 (citation omitted). The paiiy challenging
12

the constitutionality of a statute "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." State v. Hart,

13

135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001) (citation omitted). The constitutionality of a statute is

14

a question of law. Hart, 135 Idaho at 829, 25 P.3d at 852 (citations omitted). Finally, a statute

15

"should not be held void for vagueness if any practical interpretation can be given it." Harl, 135
Idaho at 829, 25 P.3d at 852 (citation omitted).

16

In the case at bar, Defendant asserts that LC. § 49-808(2) is both unconstitutionally vague on
17
18
19
20

21

its face and unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct. The statute provides:
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning
from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5)
seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning.
The term "controlled-access" highway is defined in LC. § 49-109(5)(b) as "[a]ny highway or

22

roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other persons have no legal

23

right of access to or from the highway except at such points only or in such manner as may be

24

determined by the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway." As the Idaho Court of

25

Appeals has noted,
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1

2
3

4
5
6
7

"A facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." ... Stated differently, in a "facial vagueness"
challenge, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in
all of its applications." ... Because a defendant "who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others ... [a] court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct
before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." . . . The reason for this
suggested analytical starting point is readily apparent, for if a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, it necessarily is not
unconstitutionally vague on its face.
State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 431, 179 P.3d 1084, 1087 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations

8

omitted). Accordingly, the Court will first consider whether LC. § 49-808(2) is unconstitutionally

9

vague as applied to Defendant's conduct.

10

When interpreting a statute, a court must begin with an examination of its literal words. See
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 36,218 P.3d 10, 15 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The statutory

11

language "is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Id. (citation omitted). If the
12

language is clear and unambiguous, "a court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any

13

statutory construction." Id. (citation omitted). Defendant asserts that the statute is vague because it

14

is unclear under what circumstances a motorist must signal continuously for not less than five

15

seconds, under what circumstances a motorist must signal for not less than the last 100 feet traveled
before turning, and/or under what circumstances a motorist must do both. See Defendant's Closing

16

Arguments at 2. The Court disagrees. A plain reading of the statute indicates that a motorist must
17

signal his intention to turn or move right or left in order to warn other traffic. It is clear from the

18

language of the statute that when a motorist is on a controlled-access highway, he must signal

19

continuously for not less than five seconds. Likewise, when a motorist is turning from a parked

20

position, he must signal continuously for not less than five seconds. In all other circumstances, a
motorist must signal for not less than the last 100 feet traveled before turning.

21

Defendant also asserts that it is unclear what is meant by the term "controlled-access
22

highway," as opposed to "all other instances." See Defendant's Closing Arguments at 2. Again, the

23

term "controlled-access" highway is defined in LC.§ 49-109(5)(b). A plain reading of that statute

24

indicates that a controlled-access highway is any highway or roadway which cannot be accessed

25

directly from abutting properties. A controlled-access highway may only be accessed at such points
or in such manner as is designated by the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway.
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Defendant was traveling on Interstate 84 when Trooper Higley observed the conduct which led him
1

to initiate a traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle. At the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress,
2

David Szplett, an engineer and manager of development services for the Idaho Department of

3

Transportation, testified that Interstate 84 has no private approaches and that access is only permitted

4

at designated interchanges. Each exit and entrance area is marked by three signs. Mr. Szplett

5

testified that there is no way to exit or enter the interstate system other than at these marked areas.
Because Interstate 84 cannot be accessed directly from abutting properties and may only be accessed

6

at the designated exit and entrance areas, it is clear that Interstate 84 meets the definition of
7

"controlled-access highway" which is set forth in LC. § 49-109(5)(b). As Defendant was traveling

8

on Interstate 84, he was required to comply with the signaling requirements set forth for motorists

9

traveling on controlled-access highways, rather than the signaling requirements applicable in "all

10

other instances."
As noted above, pursuant to LC. § 49-808(2), a motorist traveling on a controlled-access

11

highway must signal his intention to move right or left continuously for not less than five seconds.
12

The Court concludes that the language of the statute defines the prohibited conduct "with sufficient

13

clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," and the

14

statute is "worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

15

Martin, 148 Idaho at 36,218 P.3d at 15. At the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, the State
introduced into evidence video taken from Trooper Higley's dash cam. Having reviewed the video,

16

the Court concludes that Defendant signaled for approximately two seconds before beginning to
17

move his vehicle to the right. See State's Exhibit 1 at 00:18:24-26. Accordingly, Defendant did not

18

signal his intention to move to the right continuously for five seconds or more, as required by LC.

19

§ 49-808(2). Because LC. § 49-808(2) clearly sets forth the conduct prohibited, the statute is not

20

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct. See Martin, 148 Idaho at 36, 218 P.3d
at 15. Further, as the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct, it is

21

necessarily not unconstitutionally vague on its face. See Laramore, 145 Idaho at 431, 179 P .3d at
22

1087.

23

24
25

Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion.to extend the duration of the traffic stop.
Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
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20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405,409,283 P.3d 722, 726 (2012) (citations
1

omitted).
2

An investigative detention "must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to

effectuate the p~rpose of the stop." Danney, 153 Idaho at 409, 283 P.3d at 726 (citation omitted).

3

Accordingly, where officers extend a routine traffic stop to allow for a drug dog search, "the

4

extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id (citation

5
6
7

8

omitted). As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted,
The standard of "reasonable articulable suspicion" is not a particularly high or onerous
standard to meet. The officer must simply be acting on more than a "mere hunch or
'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion."'
Id. at 410, 283 P.3d at 727, quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210

(2009). A reasonable suspicion exists when an officer "can articulate specific facts which, together
9

with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal activity is
10

occurring." Danney, 153 Idaho at 409-10, 283 P.3d at 726-27 (citation omitted). Further, an officer

11

"may take into account his experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts

12

gathered." Id. at 410, 283 P.3d at 727, citing State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64, 218 P.3d 790, 793

13

(Ct. App. 2009). Finally, the reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated "based on the

14

totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop." Id., citing State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,
483,988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999).

15

The Court concludes that based upon the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Higley had

16

reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop. At the hearing on Defendant's motion

17

to suppress, Trooper Higley testified that he found Defendant's stated travel plans "confusing," and

18

that what Defendant was telling Trooper Higley about his plans did not make sense. In particular,
Trooper Higley noted the quick duration of the trip, the back and forth travel that was involved, and

19

Defendant's route through Oregon and Idaho, which did not appear to be a direct route for one
20

traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole. Trooper Higley testified that he is familiar with the problem

21

of drug trafficking along the I-84 corridor through Oregon and Idaho and, through Drug Interdiction

22

Training, he is trained to look for indicators of such drug trafficking. Trooper Higley noted that

23

Defendant had very few items in the vehicle, and that the vehicle belonged to someone else.
Trooper Higley testified that based on his training and experience, a driver who is making a quick

24

trip in a third-party vehicle, carrying minimal luggage, arouses suspicion.
25
26
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Trooper Higley also noted the false information Defendant provided regarding his encounter
1

with the Oregon State Police earlier that night. Trooper Higley was aware from the information
2

provided by the Oregon State Police that Defendant's vehicle had not been searched by that agency,

3

yet Defendant indicated the Oregon State Police spent two hours searching his vehicle. Defendant

4

also stated it took about an hour to put everything back in his car, yet according to Trooper Higley's

5

observations, there were very few items in the vehicle, and it would not have taken an hour to reload
the vehicle.

Trooper Higley testified that during his conversation with Defendant, he became

6

concerned that there were narcotics in the vehicle, based on the nature of Defendant's trip and the
7

false information Defendant was providing regarding his encounter with the Oregon State Police. In

8

particular, Trooper Higley was concerned that Defendant was trying to conceal something, by

9

providing the false information about his vehicle having been searched and the Oregon State Police

10

having used a K-9.
Trooper Higley observed Defendant's reddened conjunctiva and asked Defendant to tilt his

11

head back and close his eyes, at which time he observed the eyelid tremors. Trooper Higley testified
12

that he attended an Advanced Roadside Impaired Driver Enforcement class which specifically dealt

13

with the symptoms, signs, and behavior of those who are under the influence of drugs other than

14

alcohol. Trooper Higley was specifically trained that reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors are

15

common indicators of recent marijuana use, and that such indicators of marijuana use can last for
several days after the use. Trooper Higley testified that he observed those indicators in Defendant.

16

As noted above, the reasonableness of the suspicion to extend the 'duration of a traffic stop is
17

based upon the totality of the circumstances, including an officer's experience and law enforcement

18

training, as well as the inferences which may be drawn from the facts gathered by the officer. See

19

Danney, 153 Idaho at 409-10, 283 P.3d at 726-27; Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709. The

20

Court concludes that based upon Trooper Higley's training and experience with indicators of drug
trafficking along the I-84 corridor and indicators as to recent marijuana use, as well as the inferences

21

which can reasonably be drawn from Trooper Higley's observations of Defendant and the
22

information provided by Defendant regarding his trip and his encounter with the Oregon State

23

Police, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. Accordingly,

24

under the totality of the circumstances, the extension of the traffic stop to investigate possible

25

narcotics activity and allow for the K-9 search was justified. See Danney, 153 Idaho at 409, 283
P.3d at 726.
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1

The officers had probable cause to search the trunk area of Defendant's vehicle.
2

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the

3

Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed

4

to be unreasonable unless they fall within one of several narrowly drawn exceptions. State v.

5

Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012), citing State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894,
897, 821 P.2d 949, 952 (1991). The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless

6

search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise
7

reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130

8

(Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). The "automobile exception" allows the warrantless search of a

9

vehicle "if the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other

10

evidence of a crime." Id. (citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that this
exception "include[s] within its bounds the warrantless search of automobile trunks." Gallegos, 120

11

Idaho at 898, 821 P.2d at 953, quoting State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, I 096
12

(1981 ). Probable cause is established "when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at

13

the time of the search would give rise - in the mind of a reasonable person - to a fair probability that

14

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706,

15

302 P.3d at 331, citing State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993).
A reliable drug dog's alert on the exterior of a vehicle "is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish

16

probable cause for a warrantless search of the interior." Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 302 P.3d at
17

331, citing State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999). When an officer has

18

probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, the officer is authorized to

19

search "any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found." Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706,

20

302 P.3d at 331, citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721, 173 L.Ed. 2d 485,
498 (2009).

21

Officer Plaisted testified that his K-9, Turk, is a certified, single-purpose drug detection dog.
22

Turk is certified to detect the odors of narcotics - specifically, the odors of marijuana,

23

methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. Officer Plaisted testified in detail regarding the behaviors

24

Turk exhibits when alerting on an odor of narcotics and described his observation of those behaviors

25

during Turk's sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. After Turk alerted at the driver's side door and
passenger's side door of the exterior of the vehicle, Officer Plaisted placed Turk inside the vehicle.
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1

Trooper Higley testified that when a K-9 officer places his K-9 inside the vehicle after conducting
2

the exterior sniff, this is a signal that the dog has alerted on the outside of the vehicle.· Trooper

3

Higley can also be heard on his audio explaining this to Defendant.

4

00:27:43-53. The fact that Turk was placed inside the vehicle communicated to Trooper Higley that

5

See State's Exhibit 1 at

he and Sergeant Cagle could begin searching the vehicle.
Defendant cites State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P.3d 633 (Ct. App. 2001), for the

6

proposition that an officer cannot search the trunk area of a vehicle unless the officer has probable
7

cause to believe that the contraband or evidence is concealed in the trunk. See Memorandum in

8

Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress at 8. However, the facts of this case are distinguishable

9

from those in Schmadeka. In Schmadeka, the officer believed that he smelled "the slight odor of

10

burnt marijuana coming from the passenger compartment" of the defendant's car.

Under those

circumstances, the odor of burnt marijuana in the passenger compartment alone did not justify the
11

search of the trunk of the vehicle, as such odor only supports the inference of casual drug usage. 136
12

Idaho at 599-600, 38 P.3d at 637-38. The Schmadeka court followed the reasoning of United States

13

v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10111 Cir. 2000), in which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the

14

smell of burnt marijuana is indicative of drug usage, rather than drug trafficking, and because it is

15

unreasonable to believe people smoke marijuana in the trunks of cars, the mere smell of burnt
marijuana does not create the fair probability that the trunk contains marijuana." Schmadeka, 136

16

Idaho at 600, 38 P.3d at 638, quoting Wald, 216 F.3d at 1226. In the case at bar, however, Trooper
17

Higley testified that he did not smell any odor associated with narcotics emanating from Defendant's

18

vehicle. The search of the interior of the vehicle and the trunk area in this case was not based upon

19

the slight odor of burnt marijuana coming from the passenger compartment, but rather upon the K-9

20

alerting on two places on the outside of the vehicle, under circumstances in which the odor of
narcotics was apparently not perceptible to the investigating officer. The Court concludes that based

21

upon the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to search the interior of
22

Defendant's vehicle, including the trunk area.

23
24
25
26
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1

CONCLUSION
2
3

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

4
5

Dated this~ day of December, 2013.

6

7

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

8

9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24
25
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1

2
3

I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, on this lq-ili day of December, 2013, one copy of the ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed
as follows:

4
5

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ATTN: JILL LONGHURST

6
7

8

JESSICA BUBLITZ
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
604 N. 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

9

10
11

12
13

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

By
:~~L
eputy Cieri<.
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15
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18
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20
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Hansen, Miren, 03/05/14, \.:JOsney

Courtroom503

Time
Speaker
Note
4:12:02 PM i
iState v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250
4:32:39 PM jstate Attorney
jJill Longhurst
4:32:46 PM jDefense Attorney jGerald Bublitz
;

!

4:32:54 PM fJudge Hansen
!Calls case, def. is present on bond with counsel
4:33:06 PM )Defense Attorney )comments to the Court - would like to continue trial

~

4:34:12 PM fstate Attorney
4:39:24 PM 1Judge Hansen
i
4:40:36 PM 1

i

3/5/2014

~

[comments to the Court- ready for trial
1will set for 2 day JT on 06/16/14 at 9 and PTC on 06/04/14 at
i3:00 p.m.
[END CASE
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FILED
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MAR O7 2014
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST~sW:,PHER D. RICH, Clerk
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

By MIREN OLSON
DEPUTY

'

Case No. CRFE13-5250

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL

A jury trial will be held on June 16, 2014 at 9:00 a.m.
A pretrial conference will be held on June 4, 2014 at 3:00 pm. The defendant must be
personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a written
list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all parties. If
the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be continued.

Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a
list of potential alternate judges:
Hon. G.D. Carey
Hon. Dennis Goff
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr.
Hon. Duff McKee
Hon. Renae Hoff
Hon. W.H. Woodland
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen

Hon. James C. Morfitt
Hon. Gerald Schroeder
Hon. James Judd
Hon. Gregory Culet
Hon. Michael McLaughlin
Hon. Darla Williamson
Hon. Ronald Wilper

Any sitting Fourth District Judge

IT IS SO ORDERED this .£,.day of March, 2014.

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge
cc:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
604 N 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
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5:40:58 PM \Judge
(Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 - pretrial - bond - Gerald
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!Bublitz - Jill Longhurst
5:41 :35 PM fJudge
fnotes def to plea guilty -- conditional plea of guilty to
j
!one Ct of Marijuana -- reserving his right to appeal Ct
I
!decision denying motion to suppress
5:46:13 PM

fState

5:49:31 PM

fDef Counsel

{advises the Ct willing to wait and see what the Court of
!Appeals decision is in this case
!advises the Court will be reqt'g sentencing date in
!October
lno obj but State is reqt'g a status conf date to make
jsure everything moving in the right direction

!

1
5:49:48 PM !state

I:

:

5:52:16 PM f Defendant
5:55:41 PM !M Wetherell
!

fsworn and examined by the Court
!Accepts guilty plea; orders PSI; def will obtain a
!substance abuse eval on his own Oct 15, 2014 at 3:00
status revw August 13, 2014 at 8:30

I
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......................................................................................................................
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.
GUilTY PLEA ADVISORY

Defendant's Name:
Date:

JUN O4 2014

::JM-l~~

G/'fl /'{

Pleading Guilty to: Charge(s):

Case Number(s):

~£

CIC ff-~ /3 - S :JS(.;)

Minimum & Maximum Prison/Fine

L --LS

~~-~~

'tlld

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA OF GUILTY
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE)

I. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about the crime(s) you are
• accused of committing. If you have a trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you
any questions. However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.
I unde~~ that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent before and during
trial.

--t,t---·

II. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to the crime(s) in this
case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any question or
to provide any information that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can
also refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty.
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I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to remain

silent with respect to any other crime(s) and ~respect to answering questions or providing
information that may increase my sentence.
·
.
•
Ill. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and cannot pay for
one, you canAk the judge for an attorney who will be paid by the county.
I
understand~.
IV. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty in front of the
judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial.
I un~a~d that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed innocent.

V. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court hearing to determine
whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you. In a jury trial, you have
the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must
convince each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I un$an.d that by pleading guilty I am waivi~g my right to a speedy and public jury trial.

VI. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs during a jury trial where
the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath in front of you, the jury,
·and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could
.also call your own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If
you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the state will pay the cost of
bringing your witnesses to court.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my righ~onfront the witnesses against me,
.
and to present witnesses and evidence in my defense.

QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA

(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult your attorney
before answering.)
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE

1. Do you read and write the English language?
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to
help you fill out this form?

NO

YES

NO

g)

'l'-"-7_

2. What is your age? _ _

-2-
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3. What is your true and legal n a m e ? ~

¥1

4. What was the highest grade you completed in school?
If you did not complete high school, have you received
either a general education diploma or high school
equivalency diploma?

~

)6~~/' "' S~~~u_

YES

NO~

5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health
professional?

YES~

6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health
disorder?

YES~

If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. Are you currently prescribed any medication?
If so, have you taken your prescription medication
during the past 24 hours?

YES~

YES

NO

e

8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and
informed decision in this case?

YES~

9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable to
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case?

10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement?

YES
YES

e
NO

If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement?
(If available, a written plea agreement should be
attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"')

~o
11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial
the one paragraph below which describes the type
of plea you are entering:
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement.
This means that if the district court does not impose the specific
sentence as recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to
withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. _ __

-3-
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b. I understand that my plea agreement is a .con-bindino plea
agreement. This means that the court is not bound by the agreement
or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence
authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above.
Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court

chooses not to follow th~eement, I will not have the right to
withdraw my guilty plea.

.

12. As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading
guilty to more than one crime?

YES

If so, do you understand that your sentences for each
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after the other)?

13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues?

e)

YES

NO

cfjJ

NO

~
~

If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal?

&
14. Have you waived your
t to appeal your judgment
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea
agreement?

YES

15. Have any other promises been made to you which have
influenced your decision to plead guilty? ·

YES

r6
~
C__,}

If so, what are those promises?

16. Have you had sufficient time to discuss
your case with your attorney?

~NO

17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty?

~NO

18. Is there anything you have requested your attorney
to do that has not been done?

YES~

If yes, please explain.
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19. Your attorney can get various items from the
prosecutor relating to your case. These may include
police reports, witness statements, tape recordings,
photographs, reports of scientific testing, etc. This is
called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence
provided to your attorney in discovery?
20. Are there any witnesses whose testimony would show
that you are innocent?

@No
YES

e

21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive

any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe
you may have in this case?
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that
you believe should still be filed in this case?

®No
YES~

If so, what motions or requests?

23. Do you· understand that if you enter an unconditional
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including:
1) any searches or seizures that occurred in your case;
2) any issues concerning the method or manner of your
Arrest; and 3) any issues about any statements you may
have made to law enforcement officers?

~YE

(.!9

NO

24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are
admitting the truth of each and every allegation contained ~
in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty?
~ NO
YES

@

If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case
could be the basis of a violation of that probation or parole? YES

NO

25. Are you currently on probation or parole?

26. If you are not a citizen of the United States, the entry
of a plea or making of factual admissions could have
consequences of deportation or removal, inability to
obtain legal status in the United States, or denial of
an application for United States citizenship. Do you
understand?

YES

NO

YES

i!)

27. Is the crime to which you will plead guilty one which
will require you to register as a sex offender?
(I.C. § 18-8304)

-5-
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.
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case?
(I.C. §19-5304)

YES

29. Have you agreed to pay restitution in another case as
a condition of your plea agreement in this case?

YES

6)

6

If so, to whom? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a
result of a guilty plea in this case?

YES

6

If so, for how long must your license be suspended? - - - - - - 31. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual
evaluation is required?
(I.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-8317)

~
~

32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be
required to pay the costs of prosecution and
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K))

~.

33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you will be
required to submit a DNA sample to the state?
(I.C. § 19-5506)

NO

~O
~

E.

NO

34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime of violence for which
the court could impose a civil penalty of up to $5,000,

payable to the victim of the crime? (J.C.§ 19-5307)
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your
right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3)

YES~
~
~

NO

36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your r i g h ~
to hold public office in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3)
~NO
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your r i g h t ~
to perform jury service in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony
you will lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry

firearms? (J.C.§ 18-310)

-6-
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G

39. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney,
can force you to plead guilty in this case?

®

40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily?
!

'

41. Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts
alleged in the information or indictment?

NO
NO

mi) NO

42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill out
this form, have you had any trouble understanding your
interpreter?

YES

43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions
in this form which you could not resolve by discussion with
your attorney?

YES~

£.'"-:\

NO

<.!:!!!)

~

I have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully,
understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no
one has threatened me to do so.
Dated this

~ -day of _J._W\.A."'"'"'--.____ _ _ , 20

/l( .

I hereby acknowledge that I have discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and answers
with my ·

FINAL
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NO·-------/],...--//
FrLE~
/
A.M. _ _ _ _ _,P.M

~·

JUN 2 0 2014
CHRISTOPHEi-; D. RICH, Clerk
Sy KATRINA CHRISTENSEN

ocruw

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
jdl Longbur.11t

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287- noo

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
I

THE STATE OF JpAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF lDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs,

)
)

n::i:o"MAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

)
)
)

Defendant.

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
AGREEMENT FOR
CONDITIONAL PLEA
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. ll(a)(2)

-----------....----)
COMES NOW, Jill Lonkburs~ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and
defendant THOMAS CAMPBEL~ KELLEY, through his attorney Gerald Bublitz, and hereby

stipulate to a conditional plea purs\UJilt to I.C.R. l l(a)(2) as follows:
The defendant's plea of

gdlty is entered conditionally with the defendant preserving the

right to appeal the issues determined in the court's memorandum decision and order dated

December 18, 2013.

~

,

DATED this.fr· <lily of Jtfue 2014.

GREG B. BOWER

AGRIEMENT FOR CONDffiONAL PLEA (KELLEY). Page I

();
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Hansen, Miren, 08/13/14, Gosney

Courtroom503

Time
Speaker
Note
8:41 :41 AM i
jState v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5258
8:41 :51 AM (State Attorney
(George Gunn
8:41 :55 AM jDefense Attorney jGerald Bublitz
:

:

8:41 :59 AM fJudge Hansen
fcalls case, def. is present out of custody with counsel
8:42:12 AM !Defense Attorney !comments to the Court
!

8:42:20 AM tstate Attorney
8:42:28 AM (Judge Hansen
8:42:40 AM

i

I

8/13/2014

!

tnothing further
1will leave on for the sentencing date of 10/15 at 3

iEND CASE

I

1 of 1
000179

Oct 08 N-10:05a

p.2

NO.
A.M

GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562
JESSICA BLBLITZ - ISB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
604 NORTH 16TH ST
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

,,.,I( w;:

FIL~.~., _ _ __

OCT O8 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AMY LANG
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, I~ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

*****

)

)
)

vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

)
)

MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE
PENDING APPEAL

)
)
)

Defendant.
______________
)
)

COMES NO\V, the Defendant, THOMAS KELLEY, by and through his attorney of
record Jessica B. Bublitz of the furn of Bublitz Law, P.C., brings this Motion to Stay Sentence

Pending Appeal before the court;
I.A.R. 13 (c) states;
"In criminal actions, unless prohibited by the order of the Supreme Court, the
district court shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following actions
during the pendency of an appeal: (7) Determine and order whether there shall be
a stay of execution of a judgment of conviction upon an appeal to the Supreme
Court, except where the sentence is capital punishment, in which case execution
of the sentence shall be automatically stayed pending appeal."

This :Motion is made because the sentence to be imposed carries a mandatory minimum
of imprisonment; therefore, the Defendant could be finished with a prison sentence prior to an
appeal decision.
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL-

Page 1
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·Oct 08 ·1410:05a

p.3

Defense counsel further asks that pursuant to I.A.R. 13 (c)(8), the Defendant be allowed
to continue on his current bail. The Defendant has always traveled for his court hearings and can
be relied upon to continue to appear at hearings on this case.

DATED the --5.{day of October, 2014.

Attorney for Defendant

MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE PEND LNG APPEAL -

Page 2
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p.4

"' Oct 08"14 10:05a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lS-

I hereby certify that on this
day of October, 2014, l caused a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
FAX: 287-7709
Ada County Clerk
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
FAX: 287-6919

D Hand Delivery
0U.S. Mail

D Overnight Courier

121 Facsimile Transmission

D Hand Delivery
0U.S.Mail

D Overnight Courier
121 Facsimile Transmission

~\1~D~i
Legal Assistant

MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL -Page 3
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Hansen, Miren, 10/15/14, Gosney, Madsen (after 5:00 p.m.)

Time
Speaker
03:26:36 PM!
03:26:52 PM State
!Attorney
03:26:57 PM1 Defense
!Attorney
03:27: 11 PM 1Judge
!Hansen
03:27:22 PM! Judge
l Hansen
03:28: 17 PM f Judge
l Hansen
03:29:02 PM I

i

Courtroom507

Note
1State

v Thomas Kelly - CRFE13-5250

i Jill Longhurst

l
1Gerald Bublitz
!

1Calls case, def. is present on bond wtih counsel

l

1reviews file

l
fwill find good cause and continue the sentencing to 11/05/14 at
l 3:00 p.m .

................................................ ~ ........................................... ,4>, ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ .

I

10/15/2014

I END CASE

I

1 of 1
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Courtroom503

Hansen, Miren, 11/05/14, Gosney
Time
3:44:26 PM
3:44:35 PM
3:44:39 PM
3:44:47 PM
3:44:59 PM
3:45:51 PM
3:45:59 PM
3:46:21 PM
3:46:30 PM
3:46:34 PM

Speaker

I
jstate Attorney
jDefense Attorney
jJudge Hansen
jJudge Hansen
Jstate Attorney
jDefense Attorney
istate Attorney
iDefense Attorney
jDefense Attorney

I

3:47:00 PM fstate Attorney
3:51 :06 PM jDefense Attorney
4:03:11 PM jstate Attorney

I

1

4:04: 19 PM Defense Attorney
4:04:55 PM }Defendant
4:07:02 PM iDefense Attorney
4:07:05 PM jJudge Hansen

I
I
Ii

4:20:43 PM lJudge Hansen
4:21 :59 PM

l

11/5/2014

Note
!State v Thomas Kelly - CRFE13-5250

jJm Longhurst
}Jessica Bublitz
Jcalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel
Jreviews file
jno additions corrections or objections
jno additions corrections or objections
ino evidence or VIS
ino evidence
jwould be objecting to the resitution and ask that a hearing
l~s~onfu~
fargues sentencing
iargues sentencing
jresponse to the motion to stay the sentence pending
!appeal
response to Ms. Longhurst's argument
....................-...................-.................
imakes a statement to the Court

i

ino legal cause
jcomments -will enter a JOC of 1+7=8; 5000.00 fine; will
Ikeep resitution open for evidentiary hearing; will deny the
Irequest to stay the execution of this sentence; will schedule
lthe restitution hearing to 01/22/15 at 2:00 p.m.
i

jappeal rights
jEND CASE

::

::

I

I

1 of 1

000184

NO.

A.M . _ __

Fl~~~.J~ ,t

NOV O 6 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KARI MAXWELL
Dl!PUT'I'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

Defendant.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND COMMITMENT

On the 5th day of November, 2014, before the Honorable Timothy Hansen, District Judge,
personally appeared Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the Cow1ty of Ada, State of
Idaho, and Defendant with his attorney, Jessica Bublitz.
This being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter; said Defendant was duly
informed by the Court of the nature of the Information filed against him for the crime of:
TRAFFICKING IN MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l), committed on or about the
19th day of April, 2013; of his arraignment on the 28th day of June, 2013, at which time
Defendant appeared in person and with counsel and was advised of the charge(s) and the possible
penalties and was further advised of the applicable constitutional and statut01y rights. Thereafter,
on the 4th day of June, 2014, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to:

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page I
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MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l); which plea was accepted following examination
of Defendant under oath and waiver of all applicable rights.

Sentencing was continued for

preparation of a presentence report, which was completed and reviewed by the Court and
counsel.
The Court asked whether Defendant had witnesses or evidence to present in a hearing in
mitigation of punishment; heard statements from counsel; and gave Defendant an opportunity to
make a statement.
Defendant was then asked if he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be
pronounced against him to which he replied that he had none. And no sufficient cause being
shown or appearing to the Court why judgment should not be rendered;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant is guilty of
the crime of: TRAFFICKING IN MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l), and that he
be sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Correction of the State of Idaho for an
aggregate term of eight (8) years, to be served as follows: a minimum period of confinement of
one (1) year, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed seven (7)
years; with credit for two (2) days served in prejudgment incarceration as provided by§ 18-309,
Idaho Code.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that pursuant to Idaho Code, Defendant be, and hereby is,
assessed and Ordered to pay the following fines, fees, and costs:
1.

Court costs in the amount of$17.50 (LC.§ 31-3201A(b), LC. §31-4602).

2.

County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of$10.00 (LC.§ 31-4502).

3.

!STARS technology fee in the amount of$10.00 (LC.§ 31-3201(5)).

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page 2
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..

4.

Emergency Surcharge Fee in the amount of$100.00 (LC.§ 31-3201H).

5.

Victim's Compensation Fund Fees in the amount of $75.00 (LC. § 72-1025).

6.

P.O.S.T. fees in the amount of $15.00 (LC.§ 31-3201B).

7.

Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Fund $3.00
(LC. § 72-1105).

8.

Victims Notification Fee (VINE) in the amount of $10.00
(LC.§ 31-3204).

9.

A fine in the amount of $5,000.00.

10. The Court reserves jurisdiction over the amount of restitution.
11. A $30.00 domestic violence fine (LC.§ 32-1410).
12. Defendant shall pay $10.00 for the drug hotline fee pursuant to LC. § 37-2735A.
13. Defendant shall pay an amount to be determined by the Depaiiment of
Correction, not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100.00), for the cost of
conducting the pre-sentence investigation and preparing the pre-sentence
investigation report. The amount will be determined by the Department and paid
by Defendant in accordance with the provisions of LC. § 19-2516.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall fully comply with the DNA Database Act.
Defendant was then remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County, to be delivered
FORTHWITH by him into the custody of the Director of the State Board of Correction of the State
ofldaho.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment and
Commitment to the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of Defendant.
DATED this 5th day ofNovember, 2014.

c

>

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on the

~ day of ~tY).b,;u ,2014, I caused to

be emailed I mailed one copy of the within instrument in this cause as follows:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTNG ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
VIA EMAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
604 N. 16TH STREET BOISE, IDAHO 83702
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION TEAM/DEPT. OF PROBATION & PAROLE
VIA EMAIL
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
VIA EMAIL
ADA COUNTY JAIL
VIA EMAIL

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page 4
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Ada County Mugshot - Prosecutor's Office
User:

PRFREDSM

Name: KELLEY, THOMAS CAMPBELL
Case#: CR-FE-2013-0005250
LE Number: I 051391
Weight: 180

Height: 600

Drivers License Number:
Sex: M

Race: W

Drivers License State:

Eye Color: BLU

Hair Color: BLN

Facial Hair:

Marks: SHOULDER, LEFT
Scars:
Tattoos:

Photo Taken: 2013-04-19 0 I :20:00

Wednesday, May I, 2013

000189

.RE\INST ALLS\InHouse\Crystal\Analyst4\Sheriff\SHF MugshotProsecutor.r~

Nov 111411 :44a

p.2

'

~'~J.~---NOV 12 2014

GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ- ISB# 6649

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AMY LANG
DePUTY

BUBLITZ LAW, P .C.
604 NORffl 16m STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

*****
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

)
)
)

vs.

THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250
MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE
PURSUANT TO LC.R. 35 AND REQUEST
FORBEARING

)
)
)

--------------)
COMES NOW, the Defendant, THOMAS KELLEY, by and through his attorney, Jessica

B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, PC, and moves this Court to reduce the sentence imposed on
the Defendant on the 5th day of November, 2014.

TIUS MOTION is made pursuant to Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, based upon the
following grmmds and reasons:
1.

Defendant requests that the court reconsider its initial sentence and grant the
Defendant leniency; Specifically, the defendant will be requesting a lesser
indeterminate sentence than imposed.

MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 1.c.R. 35 - Page 1
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.

Nov 11 14 11 :44a

DATED this

p.3

/_j_day ofNovember, 2014.
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JL

I hereby certify that on this
day of November, 2014, I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 West Front Street

Boise, Idaho 83 702

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Courier

0U.S.Mail

FAX: 287-7709

~ Facsimile Transmission

Ada County Clerk
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

D Hand Delivery

FAX: 287-6919

0U.S. Mail

D Overnight Courier

IZI Facsimile Transmission

MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 35- Page 2
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Nov 111410:22a
NO,

a,/

p.2
RLED

AM.::/!)

NOV 12 2014

GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
604 NORTH 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

~M~~~~

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AMY LANG
D!PUTY

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
) Case No.CR-FE-2013-5250
)
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG BOWER, ADA COUNTY
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

I.
The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the final Decision and Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 6th
day of November, 2014, the Honorable Hansen, DistrictJudge presiding.

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 11 ( c)(1-10).
3.
A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then intends to assert
in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal, is/are:
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Pugc 1

000192

.

Nov 111410:22a

p.3

(a)

Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to wit: I.C.§49-808(2) is void fo[
vagueness as applied to this case because the statutory terms have not been clearly
defined so that average individuals would understand what conduct is prohibited

by the statute; in addition the lack of sufficient clarity in the wording of the
aforementioned statute invites arbitrazy and discriminatory enforcement.

(b)

Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to wit: The officer in this case did not
have justification or sufficient information which would give rise to reasonable
suspicion for the stop.

(c)

Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to wit: There is no probable cause
which would have justified the search of the trunk area.

4.
There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record that is sealed is
the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI).

5.
Reporter's Transcript. The appellant [equests the preparation of the entire reporter's
standard transcript as defined in I.AR. 25(c). The appellant also requests the preparation of
the additional portions of the reporter's transcript:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Motion Hearing on the 191h day of August, 2013
Motion Hearing on the 11 1h day of September, 2013
Motion Hearing on the16 1h day of October, 2013
Motion Hearing on the 6111 day ofNovember, 2013
Sentencing Hearing on the 5th day November, 2014

of

6.
Clerk's Record. The appeqant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R.
28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, in
addition to those automatically included under I.AR. 28(b)(2):

(a)

All items, including any affidavits, objections, responses, briefs or
memorandums, offered in support of or in opposition to the Motion to
Suppress filed or lodged, by the state, appellant or the court;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2
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(b)

7.

Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact
statements, addendums to the PSI or other items offered at sentencing
hearing.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
Reporter,;

(b)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho Code §§
31-3220, 31-3220A, I.AR. 24(e));

(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal
case (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, l.A.R. 23(a)(8));

(d)

That Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's
transcript, as the client is indigent, LC. §§ 31-3220, 3 l-3220A, I.AR.
24(e); and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.AR20.

DATED this 10th day ofNovember~ 2014.

Aomyfo:C:::
~
s .

. Bublitz
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CERTIFICATE OF l.\'1AILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on the 101h day ofNovember, 2014, I faxed true and correct copies
of the _foregoing, NOTICE OF APPEAL to:

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Id 83720-0010
Fax: (208) 854-8074

D Hand Delivery
0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
[gJ Facsimile Transmission

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

D Hand Delivery

Ada County Court Reporter
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-7509

D Hand Delivery

Ada County Clerk
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-6919

0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
IX] Facsimile Transmission

0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
IZ} Facsimile Transmission

D Hand Delivery
0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
~ Facsimile Transmission

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 4

000195

~

Nov 13.1409:0?a
\

({5l)

p.2
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GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
604 NORTH 16T11 STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AMY LANG
OePUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JL"'DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

*****
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff7Respondent,
vs.

THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

)
)

MOTION FOR EXEMPTIOJ\'" FR0)1
PAYING FEE FOR PREPARA.TION OF

)

RECORD

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant/Appellant, THO.lv1AS KELLEY, by and through his

attorney of record, Jessica Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, PC, pursuant to his Appeal filed on
:i\ovember 10, 2014, and moves the Court to order that above named Appellant be exempt from
paying the estimated fee for the preparation of record because the appellant is indigent.

THIS MOTIOK is based on and for the following grounds and reasons:

1.

The ind.igency is a basis for exemption to payment. I.C. §31-3220, §31-

3220(a), I.A.R. 24(e).
Defendant respectfully requests the Court to enter an Order p11rsuant hereto.
MOTION FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYJNG FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD· Page I
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DATED this 13111 day of November, 2014.

~ - - - = -Z- - - - - 1

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on the 13 111 day of November, 2014, I faxed true and correct copies of
the foregoing, Motion for Exemption to:
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Id 83720-0010
Fax: (208) 854-8074
Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-7709
Ada County Court Reporter
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-7509
Ada County Clerk
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-6919

D Hand Delivery
0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
[g] Facsimile Transmission

D Hand Deli very
D U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier
lg] Facsimile Transmission

D Hand Delivery

D U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier

lg] Facsimile Transmission

D Hand Delivery
D U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier

[gJ Facsimile Transmission

~~kb~~
myMcK
1e
Legal Assistant

MOTIOl'i FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD. Page 2
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FILBD
P.M_ _ __

NOV 13 ·2014
GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

JESSICA BLBLITZ - ISB# 6649
B"l"BLITZ LA
P.C.
604 NORTH 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104

By AMY LANG

,v,

DePUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
*** **

STATE OF 1DAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO: CR-FE-2013-5250

AFFIDAVIT OF INDfGENCY

)
THOMAS KELLEY,

)

)

______________
Defendant.

)
)

COMES NOW, the Defendant, THOMAS KELLEY, by and through his attorney of
record, Jessica B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C., and offers this affidavit of indigency, in
support of the Defendant's Motion for Exemption from Paying Fee for Preparation of Record.

I, THOlvfAS KELLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. I have been in the Ada County Jail since the 5111 day of November 2014.
2. 1 have no income or employment at this time.
3. I do not ovm any assets or real estate.
4. I do not have a spouse.

AFFIDAVIT OF' 11':DIC E:'llCY- Page J
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5. I do not have any dependants.
6. I do not have any money in my checking account and my savings account balance is
$

--er .

7. I have debt in the amount of$ \ tD 1I ~OD~~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.J."\l TO b.efore me this l'2 day of November 2014.

THOMAS KELLEY

.......,,,, .. -·
.. ... .
~~.•....;.oiARy•. ~.
: :
~--.. :.• -·-- C ....i -.5
,,,,,

.

\--

\

...

......, ~ McK.1?,1/'',.,~
..~ .J.
.~.::.
. . . ...•••••••••~•..;.>_>
,.<'.
·~

..... ·-·

\ . •••• PLJa\..t -~.~~-/
~ u':;.. ••
•• ~-,:,
~•,, .r_;,
••••••••\\.I
.("\\.~....,...
·17'p

..........

'•1,,

C.

Of,,,,,,,,,,

Notary
Residing at Boise
,
Commission Expires 6/l6i2017

AFFIDAVIT OF 11\'DJG E~CY- Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _\Q day of November, 2014, I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below:

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Id 83 720-00 I 0
. Fax: (208) 854-8074

D Hand Delivery
[J U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-7709

D Hand Deli very
D U.S. Mai]
0 Overnight Courier

Ada County Court Reporter
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
.Fax: (208) 287-7509

D Hand Delivery

Ada County Clerk
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax: (208) 287-6919

D Hand Delivery
0U.S. Mail
D Overnight Courier
12:?:] Facsimile Transmission

[XI Facsimile Transmission

IZ] Facsimile Transmission

0U.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
12:?:] Facsimile Transmission

Legal Assistant

AFFIDA YIT OF INDIGENCY- Page 3

000200

NO·----=,.-.----A.M._ _ _ _FllE_..•~
j_ %

J;

NOV 2 0'2014
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST1fiel~~:~ ~i.:~H, Clerk
DEPUTY

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRFE13-5250

ORDER ON RULE 35 MOTION

On November 12, 2014, Defendant Thomas Campbell Kelley filed his Motion to
Reduce Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 and Request for Hearing. Defendant notes that his
request for reconsideration of his sentence is one for leniency and specifically asks that a
lesser indeterminate sentence be imposed.
The Court would first note the Defendant's Rule 35 motion was filed less than one
week after of the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment entered in this case on
November 6, 2014. In addition, ''when a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims
his sentence is excessive even though it is within statutory limits, the motion must be
supported by new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 737, 170
P.3d 397 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
Therefore, although not specifically requested, Defendant will have forty-five days
from the date of this order to submit additional information for the Court's consideration.
The Court will then decide whether to hold a hearing on Defendant's motion or rule
without one .

000201

.. \

In entering this order, the Court has specifically not determined whether it has
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C.R. 35 or any other rule to hear a motion or whether there is
merit to such motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this / ?~ day of November, 2014.

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

000202

I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

~0

day of November, 2014, I mailed (served) a

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
ATTENTION: JILLLONGHURST
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
604 NORTH 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

000203

NO. _ _ _,:ii;;;:.-----,--A.M. _ _ _ _F,~Le.~

IJ.'/f

JAN O5 2015
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~fli'1slrof:,~

o. RICH, Clerk

By MIREN OLSON

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant.

DEPUTY

Case No. CRFI;:13-5250

ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION

On November 12, 2014, Defendant Thomas Campbell Kelley filed his Motion to
Reduce Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 and Request for Hearing. In its Order on Rule 35
i

Motion entered on November 20, 2014, this Court gave Defendant forty-five days to
submit additional materials for the Court's consideration. The deadline for submitting
those materials has passed an~ the Court has received no additional information from
Defendant.
On November 6, 2014, the Court entered its Judgment of Conviction and
Commitment. Defendant was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of
Correction for a term of eight years with the first year fixed for the felony offense of
Trafficking in Marijuana with a fine of $5,000. The Court reserved jurisdiction over the
amount of restitution. Defendant now asks the Court to reconsider its decision and reduce
the indeterminate portion of his sentence. However, Defendant has provided no new or
additional materials in support of his Rule 35 motion.
Defendant makes no claim his sentence is outside statutory limits. In fact, he
concedes his Rule 35 motion is a "plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence

000204
.M .. )

:

originally imposed was unduly severe." State v. McCulloch, 133 Idaho 351,352, 986 P.2d
1017 (Ct. App. 1999) (internal citation omitted). Consideration of Rule 35 motion is left
to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 114 Idaho 384, 386, 757
P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1987). "[W]hen a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims his
sentence is excessive even though it is within the statutory limits, the motion must be
supported with new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 737, 170
P.3d 397 (2007) (internal citation omitted). Without any new information from
Defendant, the Court is being asked to reconsider its Judgment of Conviction and
Commitment based only on what was available at the time of sentencing. Furthermore,
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was excessive.

In imposing sentence, the Court considered the four factors set forth in State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). Defendant has provided
nothing that would affect this Court's prior consideration of the Toohill criteria and, as
noted above, has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was excessive or unduly severe.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 and
Request for Hearing is denied without further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

S~

day of January, 2015.

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

000205
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

((J

day of January, 2015, I mailed (served) a

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
ATTENTION: TILL LONGHURST
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
JESSICA BUBLITZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
604 NORTH 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

000206

FILED
Wednesday, January 21, 2015 at 11 :00 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

ORDER TO TRANSPORT

Defendant.
Inmate Number:

It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody of the Idaho State Board of
Correction, and that it is necessary that THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY be brought before
this Court for:

Hearing Scheduled ........ Thursday, January 22, 2015@ 02:00 PM
It is THEREFORE ORDERED That the Ada County Sheriff bring the Defendant from
the Penitentiary to the Court at said time and on said date;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That immediately following said Court appearance the
Sheriff will return the said Defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction until
the court orders otherwise;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Idaho State Board of Correction release the said
Defendant to the Ada County Sheriff for the purpose of the aforementioned appearance and await
further order of the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of this Court serve a copy hereof upon the
Idaho State Board of Correction forthwith and certify to the same.
Dated Wednesday, January 21, 2015.

t·-4
j

TIMOTHY HANSEN
DISTRICT JUDGE

. Order to Transport
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Jan 22 'i 5 02:28p

Fl~~----

JAN 23 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MIREN OLSON
DEPUTY

GERALD. BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562
JESSICA BUBLITZ - lSB# 6649
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C.
604 NORTH 16TH STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-5500
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF 1DAHO, 11\" AND FOR THE COONTY OF ADA
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250

)

ORDER FOR EXEMPTI01\" FROM
PAYING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

RECORD

Based upon Motion of counsel and good cause appea1ing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER that the above named
Defend~ntiApp;ll~Thom~ Kelley, is hereby exe~pt from paying fees for preparation of
, ~ , ~ ~o,.,.e..,./'

t'f&V

record~:J::i~ fu?Jtranscript J.>£ the 8f3~i!ll&te.!j:.otei,

~--

t;;~~ the Motion to Suppress Hearing

held on the recorcJ.ta;ans@:t:'ie8ili.._.,.

SO ORDERED this~ day of--1-d=~-' 2015.

r

r

~~·HONORABLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
ORDER FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD- Page 1
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Jan 22 i 5 02:29p

CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
I hereby certify that on this !J:3 day of ~C.Ui\,(.Q..i~ 2015, I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing documents to be placed in the UnitedT tates Mail, postage prepaid to:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St. Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Fax: (208) 287-7709
Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702
Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720-0101
Boise, Idaho
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Jessica Bublitz
604 N. l 6th St
Boise, ID 83 702

LEm ./- 0 •
.;.• ~
., «': ••• '? •• """
".-., J/J, o••• • •• I"\\.'"' ......
..,, q'Js1a 1~\..., ....

.........
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Hansen, Miren, 01/22/15, .::,tarr

Time
Speaker
9:18:50 AM l
2:05:47 PM \State Attorney
2:05:51 PM fDefense Attorney
2:05:56 PM !Judge Hansen
I

Courtroom501

Note
\State v Thomas Kelley- CRFE13-5250

jBen Harmer
jGerald Bublitz
icalls case, def. is present in custody with counsel - reviews

lfi~

2:07:43 PM 1state Attorney

!with an affidavit in the file would withdraw the objection

2:08:54 PM 1Judge Hansen
/

lwill set over the restitution hearing to 02/06/15 at 3:00 p.m.
/and will have the clerk do the transport order

!

~

2:09:15 PM iJudge Hansen

l
l

I

IEND CASE

l
i

I
~
~

1/22/2015

i
iwill turn to the request for indigency on the clerks record for
/the appeal and given the affidavit of indigency and Mr.
lKelley's custody status - the Court will find good cause and
/grant the motion at this time and will have Mr. Bublitz
!submit an order consistent with the ruling

l

2:11 :32 PM

I

~

I
I
I

1 of 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,

ORDER TO TRANSPORT

Defendant.
Inmate Number:

It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody of the Idaho State Board of
Correction, and that it is necessary that THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY be brought before
this Court for:

Hearing Scheduled ........ Friday, February 06, 2015@ 03:00 PM
It is THEREFORE ORDERED That the Ada County Sheriff bring the Defendant from
the Penitentiary to the Court at said time and on said date;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That immediately following said Court appearance the
Sheriff will return the said Defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction until
the court orders otherwise;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Idaho State Board of Correction release the said
Defendant to the Ada County Sheriff for the purpose of the aforementioned appearance and await
further order of the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of this Court serve a copy hereof upon the
Idaho State Board of Correction forthwith and certify to the same.

Dated Friday, January 23, 2015.

~
TIMOTHY HANSEN
DISTRICT JUDGE

Order to Transport

000211

TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

STATE OF IDAHO,
)Supreme Court No.
Plaintiff-Respondent,

42680

)

vs.

)Case No. CRFE-13-5250
)

THOMAS KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________

)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on January 23, 2015,

I

lodged a transcript 206 pages of length for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
the County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District.

HEARING DATES INCLUDED:

Motion to Suppress,

9-11-13

Cont. Motion to Suppress, 10-16-13.
Sent. 11-5-14

Vanessa M. Starr, Official Court Reporter

~Al~"'
c:931 dotV
at
'er

\

000212

N0._~~:.7ii'En"---A.M. __j......_:4.J..Y~FILE:O
P.M. _ __

JAN 2 6 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KELLE WEGENER
DEPUTY

Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

In re: State of Idaho v. Thomas Kelley, Docket No.

Notice is hereby given that on Wednesday, January 21, 2015, I lodged
a transcript of 9 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.
'

The following files were lodged:
Proceedings 8-19-2013

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court

000213

No.
A.M
·----

F=Jf.Eo

----P.M.

JAN 29

CHA!S7io

PHf=Ao

~!

2015

By Ki:LLE: VVs. AICH, Cle k
DE:Pury Gi:Nt:A
I'.

Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

In re: State of Idaho v. Thomas Kelley, Docket No. 42680

Notice is hereby given that on Tuesday, January 27, 2015, I lodged a
transcript of 19 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.
The following files were lodged:
Proceedings 11-6-2013

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Supreme Court Case No. 42680
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record:
1. Presentence Investigation Report.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 28th day of January, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

000215
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HONORABLE TIMOTHY HANSEN
CLERK: MIREN OLSON
CT REPTR: VANESSA GOSNEY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

September 11, October 16, 2013

)

)
)
)

vs.

)

THOMAS KELLEY,

)
)

Case No. CRFE13-5250

)

Defendant.

EXHIBIT LIST

)

_______________ )
Counsel for State:
Counsel for Defendant:

Jill Longhurst
Jessica Bublitz

STATE'S EXHIBITS
1.
Video and Audio
2.
Map (Illustrative Only)
3.
Map (Illustrative Only)

Admit - 09/11/13
Admit
10/16/13
Admit - 10/16/13
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42680
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, CHRJSTOPHER D. RlCH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

JESSICA B. BUBLITZ

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42680
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.

THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct ~ecord of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
12th day of November, 2014.
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